

HEARINGS
ON
MILITARY POSTURE
AND

**H.R. 2440, TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS
DURING FISCAL YEAR 1964 FOR PROCURE-
MENT, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST,
AND EVALUATION OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES,
AND NAVAL VESSELS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES**

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION



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88TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

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HEARINGS ON MILITARY POSTURE AND H. R. 2440, TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING FISCAL YEAR 1964, FOR PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, AND NAVAL VESSELS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., January 30, 1963.

The committee met at 10 a.m., the Honorable Carl Vinson (chairman of the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

A quorum of the committee is present.

Members of the committee, this morning we start our annual posture hearings which will be followed immediately by consideration of the legislation relating to 412, the procurement hearing.

We have the distinguished Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, with us this morning.

After Mr. McNamara has completed his statement, we will hear the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Taylor. Then we will hear from Dr. Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense.

Now, each member has before him the Secretary's statement. It is highly classified, and I will ask you to let it remain on your desk when you leave the committee room.

It is 181 pages long, with 40 pages of charts, making a total of 221 pages.

Because of its great length I have respectfully requested the Secretary to follow the same course as last year, that is, to present the whole statement to the committee for its consideration, but to read only those portions which are particularly important.

However, this procedure is by no means to be interpreted as indicating that there is anything in the statement which is not of importance. It merely represents a more practical approach to the matter of fully informing the committee while not consuming an unreasonable length of time in oral testimony.

Mr. McNamara was kind enough to send up to the committee three advance copies.

I have examined mine very closely and have a great many marked places in it. Sometime during the hearing I hope to be able to make inquiry of Mr. McNamara with respect to these particular matters.

While the most important portions of it will be read by Mr. McNamara, I commend the whole statement to every member of the committee.

Moreover, every member of the committee can have the opportunity to read it in full.

I have instructed the staff to keep several copies of the statement readily available for those members who wish to come to the committee room and read it.

Of course no copies can be removed from the committee room as it is highly classified.

Under our rules which we adopted yesterday, no classified documents of any kind can leave the committee room.

It is available to be read any time you wish to come down here to examine it and study it.

Now, Mr. Secretary, we welcome you here this morning.

You are at liberty now to present your posture statement in any form you desire.

However, I would suggest that when you cover certain phases, that at the points that you desire to do so, you stop to permit at that point questions to be asked.

And I hope the members will confine the questions to the subject matter that has just been covered.

Now I have requested the Secretary to furnish the committee information with reference to Cuba.

I also have requested that he furnish information with reference to the removal of the bases out of Turkey and Italy, and several other matters.

These matters are not in his brief, but he will furnish that information to the committee while he is the witness in the posture briefing.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you may start.

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Because of your request for information on the introduction of—

The CHAIRMAN. Now wait 1 minute.

Now, Mr. Smart, this is an executive session. Everybody has clearance to be in the committee room?

Mr. SMART. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed now.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, because of your request for information on the introduction of the offensive weapons system into Cuba, I thought it might fit your purpose to start with that subject, and we are prepared to do so this morning.

I will outline very briefly some of the events that led up to the introduction of those weapons systems and then call on General Carroll and members of his staff to further elaborate on the intelligence operations that led to the disclosure of the introduction of those systems into Cuba.

In addition, Soviet equipment en route to Cuba was kept under visual surveillance during the daylight hours while it was at sea in the vicinity of Cuba and when the ships were in Cuban ports. Through this medium, and through other sources, we were able to keep abreast of the accelerated shipment of arms in Soviet bottoms—but none of this equipment could be identified with offensive missile systems. It now appears, based on what we have subsequently observed, that the offensive missiles and associated equipment were clandestinely loaded and transported to Cuba in holds of large hatch Soviet ships and apparently began arriving in Cuban ports in approximately mid-September. Since all of the strategic missile-associated equipment—such as erectors and transporters—and the missiles themselves were concealed in the holds of the ships and unloaded under the cover of darkness, and under the most stringent Soviet-controlled security

restrictions, photographic surveillance at the time was unable to discover the initial introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba.

Firm intelligence on the existence of offensive ballistic missiles was developed in this sequence:

First, from April to late September, a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors, principally from refugees and exile organizations, was received concerning the situation in Cuba. Many thousands of refugees were interviewed and several thousand specific written reports were produced, analyzed for intelligence value, and collated with other source material. Although a large number of these and other reports received in Washington related to the extensive military buildup, none could be equated to strategic weapons when carefully checked out. Actually, interpretation of the high altitude photographs taken before October 14, 1962, of the areas which refugee reports indicated as the most likely locations to contain missiles, either disproved the presence of missiles or linked the suspected activity to SAM or cruise-type missiles that posed no offensive threat to the United States.

The second crucial stage of the story started in late September when a recently arrived Cuban refugee gave the first description of equipment that could be equated with a medium-range ballistic missile. Although raw and unevaluated, this report was an indication of the possible presence in Cuba of offensive ballistic missiles.

The third and final stage in our detection of strategic missiles resulted from careful evaluation of this refugee report, together with other intelligence. In conjunction with a suspicious pattern of deployment of SAM sites noted in the same general area—a pattern which could not be related to any known military installations—analysis of this single report resulted in the designation of a specific area as a suspect medium-range ballistic missile site. Photographic coverage was thereupon proposed, and on the 14th of October a military high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft flew a flight route specifically planned to cover this suspect MRBM area. This led to the discovery of the San Cristobal MRBM complex. The aircraft flew directly over the assigned target area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal MRBM complex.

This is the story of the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba by the Soviet Union, as viewed from the Department of Defense.

Up to the spring of 1962, the Soviet Union had supplied the Cuban Army with great quantities of conventional weapons and supplies, from pistols and rifles to heavy artillery and medium tanks. Mig-15, 17, and 19 aircraft and helicopters had been provided the Cuban Air Force, and motor torpedo boats and coastal patrol vessels of the *Kronshtadt* class had been delivered to the Cuban Navy.

During the latter part of July and the early part of August, an unusual number of Soviet ships unloaded cargo and passengers at Cuban ports. There were also reports that during the unloading process, all Cubans were excluded from the dock areas and that the stevedoring was accomplished by Soviet personnel accompanying the equipment. By the middle of August, analysis of these reports highlighted the possibility that the Soviet Union was probably introducing surface-to-air missile systems in Cuba, and accordingly special attention was focused on the suspected areas of deployment. As a result of the next high altitude reconnaissance mission, flown on the 29th of August, positive identification was established of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of these suspect locations and at

six others also in Western Cuba. A short-range coastal defense cruise missile installation was also subsequently identified.

Up to this time, high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba were flown on a regular schedule, weather permitting. These missions were directed to cover the principal airfields, ports, and areas of particular military significance. As a result, we were able to keep close watch on the progress of aircraft deliveries and assembly, airfield improvements, new construction of military installations, development of defensive works around critical areas, delivery and operational readiness of naval units, and the security of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo. Each flight after August 29 through October 7 discovered new SAM sites, and three additional cruise missile sites were revealed. Still, there was no evidence indicating the presence of an offensive capability; all these missile systems were defensive in nature.

This mission which verified the existence of MRBM's in Cuba was then followed by a concentrated reconnaissance effort by both high-flying and low-flying reconnaissance aircraft of the Navy and the Air Force.

After this successful flight of the 14th, the next operational task was to obtain aerial photography of the complete island to determine the precise nature of the buildup and the exact configuration of missile sites, their number and location, and the status of their readiness along with other related activity. The program was planned so as to photograph at high altitude all of the known or suspected sites, and, at the same time, perform search reconnaissance over the entire island to determine possible additional missile locations, or other significant military activity. When the high-flying aircraft located the objectives, then low-flying aircraft could be dispatched over selected targets to obtain detailed information. With large-scale photography of selected objectives from aircraft flying at altitudes of 500 to 1,000 feet, this information could be readily obtained.

On the day following the President's message, specifically on the 23d of October, low-altitude flights were initiated. These flights, flown at high speed, were generally over Cuban territory a maximum of from 4 to 7 minutes. The results were of course outstanding, and these missions were continued on a regular basis with both Navy F-8-U's and Air Force RF-101's participating.

Thus, during the crisis, with the high-altitude aircraft providing reconnaissance of wide areas, and the low-flying aircraft providing closeup reconnaissance of selected objectives, the U.S. Intelligence Community was provided with a continuous stream of photography on the basis of which a complete assessment of the situation could be made.

Some comments regarding the present status of Soviet military forces in Cuba, as compared to last July, are appropriate. About 17,000 Soviet military personnel remain in Cuba. Since last July the Soviets have introduced and deployed, in addition to the MRBM's and IL-28 jet light bombers subsequently removed, some 24 surface-to-air (SAM) sites and several coastal defense cruise missile sites. They have also introduced 12 *Komar*-class cruise-missile motorboats, about 40 Mig-21 jet fighters (in addition to more than 60 Mig-15's, 17's, 19's previously introduced), substantial numbers of late-model tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery weapons, antitank missiles, and other battlefield weapons.

At present, the principal elements of the air defense systems, including the SAM sites and the Mig-21 jet fighters are probably controlled and manned by the Soviets. The more modern ground equipment is integral to four highly mobile Soviet ground forces which still remain in Cuba.

We are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that 42 medium-range ballistic missiles were removed from Cuba aboard 8 Soviet ships between November 5 and 9, and that 42 IL-28 bombers were similarly removed between December 5 and 6.

All of the IL-28 bombers and 36 of the missile/transporters were uncovered for photographic and visual alongside inspection while the Soviet vessels were at sea and the remainder of the missiles were observed covered in exactly the same observable condition as previously noted at the specific missile sites. We are convinced that the Soviets did not have sufficient time between the decision to dismantle and the actual shipment dates to construct dummy missiles and transporters possessing the fine detail and precise measurements of the equipment shipped out. Photographic evidence also is available showing both outloading and outshipping of missile erectors and of fuel and oxidizer trailers. Without this associated equipment, a missile system is inoperative. Since removal of the missiles, our coverage has not revealed the existence of strategic weapons systems in Cuba.

Mr. Chairman, at that time I would like to introduce General Carroll, who in turn will introduce members of his staff who participated in this effort and who will show you certain of the photographs and describe in more detail the process we used to lead to the results I have outlined.

General Carroll.

The CHAIRMAN. General Carroll.

General CARROLL. Mr. Chairman, with your permission we should like to offer for the consideration of this committee a chronological photographic review of the overall Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, with particular emphasis upon the deployment of offensive weapons systems, their peaking toward operational readiness, and their subsequent rapid dismantling, movement to the ports, and withdrawal from the island.

We hope that this sequential pictorial review will provide a clear understanding of this phase of the Cuban story.

I would like to introduce Mr. John Hughes of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a special assistant on my staff for photoanalysis matters.

Mr. Hughes will present this phase of the presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

All right, Mr. Hughes.

Mr. HUGHES. Gentlemen, the Soviet offensive military buildup in Cuba, in addition to provoking certain swift military and political responses on the part of the United States, caused to be implemented one of the most intensive military reconnaissance efforts ever directed against a single objective area.

This intensive effort, employing a variety of sensory media, has been continued up to the present time. The purpose of this briefing is to relate chronologically the nature and extent of the Soviet buildup as reflected by reconnaissance means.

We will begin with offensive systems, long-range ballistics missiles, and jet bombers. Included in this category will be the nuclear weapons storage facilities which the Soviets were constructing at each of their offensive missile bases.

We will trace the Soviet offensive missile buildup from the initial deployment of systems components at the site locations, following carefully the rapid improvement of launch facilities, through to operational readiness.

We will illustrate how the United States was able to monitor the dismantling of Soviet offensive bases and to verify the loading and removal of missile components from the island. In addition, the latest photography, covering the former offensive missile bases, which was acquitted within the past few days will also be reviewed.

A similar chronological accounting will be provided for the offensive bombers. We will then review the other weapons systems introduced by the Soviets into Cuba. These will include the SA-2, surface-to-air missile; the Mig 21 fighter interceptor, the coast defense cruise missile, and the guided missile coastal patrol boats.

We will then discuss briefly the nature and size of the regular Soviet ground force units that are deployed in Cuba at the present time.

Finally, the large Soviet logistical base constructed in support of the weapons systems introduced into Cuba will also be described. As we review these aerial photographs, many items of military equipment and numerous geographic locations in Cuba will be highlighted.

In addition, there are certain items of unique military interest revealed by these reconnaissance materials on which I would respectfully request that you focus particular attention.

They are, one, the magnitude, intensity, and remarkable rapidity of the Soviet buildup, particularly as it is reflected in the period October 14 through 28; two, the Soviet faculty for simplicity and use of the field expedient; three, Soviet techniques of camouflage concealment and deception; four, U.S. reconnaissance capabilities to include the various types of strategic and tactical reconnaissance photography, low versus high altitude, color versus black and white and oblique versus vertical; and, finally, photo interpretation techniques and capabilities that were employed against and with these reconnaissance materials to include the volume review of photography and such things as measurements of ground objects to tenths of a foot.

By late October, three major offensive weapons systems were deployed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. The first and most significant, primarily because it achieved an operational capability, was the medium-range ballistic missile, the MRBM. Second in importance was the intermediate-range ballistic missile, the IRBM. The system, though far more lethal in range capability than the MRBM, never reached an operational status. The fixed IRBM launching facilities were still under construction in Cuba when Chairman Khrushchev agreed to dismantle his bases.

The Il-28 bomber, although capable of reaching target areas in the Southeastern United States and Central America, also never reached full operational status. Of the 42 unassembled bombers delivered to Cuba, only 7 reached final assembly stages and were classified as flyable, and of these initial emphasis was placed by the Soviets upon assembly of the trainer version.

There is little doubt that the Soviet Union in September of 1962 embarked upon a major military construction program in Cuba in

volving their most advanced offensive weapons systems. A primary objective was to achieve clandestinely a full operational capability for all systems by early December 1962, in order to confront the United States at that time with a fait accompli.

Fortunately, this goal was never achieved, because of the ensuing political and military actions that were accomplished in light of the timely and accurate evidence provided by the photography that we will now review in considerable detail.

(Slide: "Soviet Offensive Missile Buildup in Cuba.")

Starting first with the offensive weapons systems introduced into Cuba, it is appropriate to note that the Soviets selected four geographic locations to deploy these offensive systems. They selected the San Cristobal area, southwest of Havana; an area at Guanajay, just west of Havana; and two further east, one at Sagua la Grande and one at Remedios.

On this slide the red symbols reflect deployed Soviet field medium range ballistic missile sites. If you will notice, there are six sites depicted, four in the San Cristobal area and two in the Sagua la Grande area, 135 nautical miles to the east. Each of these sites included four launch positions and had deployed the Soviet medium range ballistic missile. In addition to the field MRBM, the Soviets also had under construction by late October 1962 fixed launching facilities for the intermediate range ballistic missile at two locations, one just west of Havana, Guanajay, where two 4-launcher sites were identified and shown in yellow on this photograph, and a single one at Remedios, farther to the east. The Remedios one, we believe, was in an early stage of construction, and it, too, would have been paired up with another four-launcher site had the Soviets had time to develop this location.

In other words, there were nine Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba, six of them with four launchers each for the MRBM, three of them, fixed sites, for the IRBM, and each of these included four launch positions.

The question might well be asked if the Soviets were able to deploy and we were able to detect by October 14, 1962, these systems deployed at these four geographic locations, what was found at these locations in prior or earlier photography?

We have selected our best photographic materials covering these sites prior to October 14 and would like to review them very quickly.

This is the Remedios IRBM location as it appeared on September 5, 1962, an open farm field situated in the virgin forest area shown, and a country road cutting through this sector that within the next 4 or 5 weeks will soon be occupied by Soviet IRBM construction forces.

This is the Guanajay IRBM location as it appeared on August 29. Again, there is no evidence of military activity or occupancy. Note again in this area, which will soon have Soviet IRBM facilities under construction, there is no evidence of activity.

Here are the IRBM locations in the San Cristobal area covered on August 29. There is no evidence of military or general occupancy observed at those locations which later were to have the Soviet offensive sites. Notice, if you will, on this particular graphic taken on August 29, as it was checked carefully by our photo activities, there is no evidence of activity.

In this area there is an open, wooded sector several heavily forested sectors through here, with no evidence of military occupancy.

Sagua la Grande area is shown on September 5 with excellent quality photography, and outlined in this rectangular area is the location of the future location of the Soviet MRBM site.

Notice, if you will, that this area was carefully checked at that time and even though there is a heavy cloud shadow through here, our photo interpreters could pick out a small village or hamlet here, and this county road, the agricultural activity, and no evidence at that time of military occupancy or activity.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is the historic photograph of the Cuban crisis. It was acquired with a high altitude aircraft moving south-north over the western sector of the Island of Cuba in the early morning hours of October 14, 1962.

Note, if you will, that the photograph appears gray in color and tone. The reason is the early morning hour, and we are also observing at this time a Soviet MRBM unit that apparently recently has just arrived in the area.

As the photo interpreters and intelligence analysts carefully reviewed this photograph on October 15, they noted eight large missile transporters, four at this location, and three at this location, and a single one at this particular location.

In addition, the Soviets had already deployed in a tentative firing position, four erector launchers, one here, and one here, and another one here, and a fourth one at this location.

No doubt, the Soviets were employing the field expedient and making every effort to achieve an operational capability at these sites as quickly as possible. Lines of propellant vehicles were observed standing nearby. Note, however, the absence of any extensive tracking or activity.

The Soviets have apparently, in the past few days pulled into this particular area, with their equipment, and have temporarily emplaced their erectors, and have set themselves up an irregularly dispersed or displaced tent area off to the side. We will observe them improve this particular location.

The intelligence analysis carefully checked the photography acquired on October 14 in the vicinity of San Cristobal. A few miles to the east another Soviet MRBM unit was just being deployed. Note, if you will, six missile transporters with missiles on them are tucked away in this small wooded area.

On October 14, again, a Soviet missile convoy is just arriving at the site, and we have caught the Soviets just as they are about to deploy their equipment at their respective firing equipments.

High-altitude photography acquired during the next few days revealed the full nature and extent of the Soviet MRBM threat as found in Cuba. In the Sagua LaGrande area, 135 nautical miles east of Havana, two 4-launcher field MRBM sites were covered one of which is shown in this graphic.

By this time, the Soviets had driven a rough road into this particular area, and four launch positions observed, one here and one here. The erectors have already been placed at the centers of these pad areas. In addition, missile shelter tents have been completed.

At these two pad areas the Soviets are still busy at work. The erectors have not been emplaced, but they stand nearby in an adjacent motor pool. Propellant vehicles are also noted.

The missile equipment that was observed in the Sagua LaGrande and San Cristobal areas was carefully examined by our intelligence

analysts. It was determined that the missile being deployed at these two locations was the standard Soviet MRBM that had been observed earlier in the Moscow parade as shown on this particular photograph. The missile, itself, measures 73.3 feet in length and has a range of 1,100 nautical miles.

When we saw this system deployed in Cuba, we saw it deployed on this identical transporter. The missile, however, was deployed, or at least taken into the field site areas, minus its nose cone. The nose cone was transported in a separate vehicle. The object we were observing, then, measured some 59.6 feet in length and was, indeed, the Soviet MRBM deployed at Sagua LaGrande and at San Cristobal.

Gentlemen, again the question is asked if a 70-foot-long missile, and if a 68- to 70-foot-long transporter were found in Cuba on October 14 and 17, how did these weapons and how did those components reach the island? The U.S. naval surface ships and aircraft had carefully photographed all Soviet ships that came to the island of Cuba in August, September, and October. We determined that the hatches of certain larger ships could accommodate the transporter and the MRBM missile.

It was our conclusion that the large-hatch Soviet ships did bring the MRBM systems clandestinely to the island of Cuba. One of these large-hatch ships, the Soviet ship *Poltava* shown here approaching the island on September 15, 1962. It is photographed obliquely and vertically. We checked carefully the deck cargo. All that we can observe loaded are simple 2½- and 5-ton trucks and vans. Notice though, that the ship rides high, as though instead of a bulk cargo it has a space-consuming cargo, such as an MRBM.

In addition to finding field MRBM's deployed in Cuba, considerable concern was evoked on October 17, 1962, when high-altitude cover provided the first positive identification of a fixed intermediate range launching site in the area of Guanajay and later in the area of Remedios. Two 4-launcher fixed sites were identified in the Guanajay area, one of which is shown on this aerial photograph. There are four launching positions, one here, another here, and two others at these locations. They are paired and focused on a central control bunker. Conduits led from the central bunker area to the center of each of the pads.

Notice that vehicle shelter revetments for vehicles which must remain in the launch position during firing are nearing completion at these locations.

At this time, a missile servicing building is roofed and nearing completion, while a nuclear warhead storage bunker is having the final touches accomplished with regard to roof construction.

The Soviets at these particular IRBM sites brought with them large amounts of prefabricated construction materials, so that they could rapidly complete their construction program at these sites.

An assessment was made by the intelligence community to the effect that the field MRBM sites on San Cristobal and Sagua LaGrande were designed to fire the 1,100-nautical-mile Soviet medium-range ballistic missile. This particular weapon deployed in Cuba could reach all key target areas in the southeastern United States, and such other important cities as Washington, St. Louis, and Dallas.

Included within the range of the weapon fired from these MRBM sites also was the Panama Canal. The 2,200-nautical-mile intermediate ballistic missile could reach most key target areas in the

North American Continent with the exception of the small portion of the northwestern section of the State of Washington, and all of Alaska. Key countries in the northwestern portion of South America also came within range of this particular weapons system.

The President directed that beginning October 23, 1962, on the day following his address to the Nation, that the U.S. military aircraft be directed in a low-altitude mode against the Soviet offensive bases on the island of Cuba, in order to provide us more definite data on the nature of the weapons systems being deployed.

The reconnaissance versions of the U.S. Air Force 101, and the Navy F-8-U, were selected for this particular mission and are shown here.

These aircraft swept in at an altitude of well below 1,000 feet and caught the Soviets by surprise on October 23, 1962. Here is the launching site at San Cristobal No. 1. The missile erected is under canvas cover at this location, but telephone cabling leads from the launch point to the covered generator to man and control equipment in the wooded sector to the upper right on this photograph.

A missile shelter tent measuring 100 feet in length and 17 feet wide has been completed. This is the place where the missile is kept and kept perfectly tuned prior to that time when it might be required at the launching position itself.

Note, if you will, that Soviet oxidizer vehicles and Soviet propellant vehicles with the fuel stand ready in this particular launch position area.

The Soviets respond quickly to our low-altitude effort. They affect camouflage and concealment where possible. Here, at San Cristobal Site No. 1, we observe three Soviet MRBM missiles on transports, one at this location and two in the lower portion of the photograph.

Note, if you will, that the Soviets have stretched tarpaulins over these missiles, and then they have taken mud or paint and disruptively smeared it across these tarpaulins in order to break up the natural outline of the cylindrical object that lies beneath.

In addition to canvas cover and disruptive painting, the Soviets also attempt camouflage. Nets are strung across these two missiles, again in an attempt to break up the natural outline of the cylindrical object lying beneath.

We note that in addition to the single missile shelter tent formerly found at these sites, a second missile shelter tent is also being constructed at the launch position areas. His second tent is for the refire missile. The Soviets intend to provide a refire capability for each of their firing positions.

In the upper portion of this photograph you will see a firing position being improved. The white rectangular area is a concrete launch pad, upon which the erector will soon be emplaced. The circular structure is a firing ring and flame deflector on which the MRBM will be emplaced. It is just resting in wet concrete. The concrete mixer can actually be seen on the photograph.

The two white linear areas off to the right are what we call wheel chocks, and the rear wheels of the Soviet transporter rides into these chocks and the transporter, acting as a carriage, rotates in the chocks and erects the missile onto the firing table observed at this location.

The Soviets improved their MRBM sites in this particular manner.

In addition to providing more permanent facilities at their missile launching sites, and in addition to effecting all means possible insofar as cover and camouflage are concerned, the Soviets, in response to our low-altitude effort, deployed the best weapons that they could to counter this reconnaissance effort. The surface-to-air missile would be ineffective against a high-speed, low-flying, supersonic aircraft. The best weapon one can use against such aircraft are conventional antiaircraft artillery, so the Soviets deployed this system at the sites.

Observed here on October 27, at San Cristobal site No. 1, is a six-launcher site with a 57-millimeter antiaircraft gun crew. Notice that the rangefinder has already been emplaced in the center of the area and the radar itself, to acquire the target, has also been emplaced.

One interesting thing there is that the Soviet crews or the Cuban crews at these particular sites never had the warning necessary as these aircraft swept in at speeds in excess of 500 knots. You can see the crewmen running toward their weapons now. It is too late to respond to these fast-moving aircraft.

The low-level photograph provided us with excellent detail on the nature of the support equipment usually associated with the Soviet MRBM. This is one of the typical firing positions for the MRBM. Notice the approach roadway. It is widened at this location and includes a missile erector under canvas cover in the center. Under canvas cover is a missile stand and flame deflector where the missile will actually rest prior to firing.

Command and control equipment is located nearby. These include vehicles and tents which are connected by cable lines back to the firing position itself. Note, if you will, that two missile shelter tents, one for the primary and one for the refire missile, are found nearby, and that telltale trackage suggests that a long vehicle has been first pushed and then backed into the missile shelter tent to the lower left.

Ladies and gentlemen, off to the right the propellant vehicles stand ready to service this site, while off to the left the nose cone and warhead area remain active. This was a completed and operational Soviet MRBM site as it was observed in Cuba on October 23.

There is a low altitude of the IRBM site at Guanajay, located in the area just west of Havana.

During this period, when low altitude cover was acquired over the sites beginning October 23, construction continued very extensively and intensively in the IRBM fixed facilities.

Note, if you will, two launch positions are observed. One here and one here. These are larger fixed launch pads in contrast to the field MRBM sites. Note, if you will, that a launch ring to hold an IRBM has already been emplaced at the location. The Soviets are working at this location to emplace a second ring.

Conduits lead to a centrally positioned control bunker which is also nearing completion. Note, if you will, the missile servicing building where again the missile is kept in tune prior to being moved into the launch position area. A nuclear warhead storage bunker is up in the upper center portion of the photograph and on the date of this particular photograph, October 23, it is nearing completion.

The Soviets constructed nuclear warhead storage bunkers at the intermediate range ballistic missile launching sites and at the medium-range ballistic missile sites. The ones at the MRBM sites were somewhat smaller, although, similarly configured to those identified at the IRBM sites.

This is one of the Soviet nuclear warhead storage bunkers under construction at San Cristobal site No. 1, southwest of Havana. The Soviets again brought quarter sections prestressed concrete arches to the island of Cuba. Each of these quarter sections were pasted together at the top to form a half section. They measured a meter wide and the Soviets quickly moved adding section by section until they had completed an arch roof structure measuring between 60 and 75 feet in length.

Notice, if you will, the Soviet crews working on the roof of the structure, the date of this particular photograph, while concrete-mixing crews as well as piles of aggregate, sand and gravel and so on, are noted in the area. But, again, the emphasis was on field expediency in the use of prefabricated materials.

Even the fence posts that the Soviets used were brought from the Soviet Union and with concrete forms, as shown in the lower left portion of the graphic.

At this particular time, in addition to making permanent facilities in and around the MRBM areas, and in addition to providing nuclear warheads storage facilities, the Soviets began on about October 27 to make things more comfortable for themselves in Cuba.

With the launch positions in the upper portions of this photograph now nearly completed, and made permanent, and with the nuclear warheads storage bunker in the upper left portion of the photograph nearing completion, the construction equipment was diverted to construct and build Soviet barracks buildings for the crews.

Note the eight buildings in line here, the one of which does not yet have its roof in place. At this particular time, on October 27, the Soviets were still working in these areas as though they were not going to go home in the very near future.

The photography that we acquired with our low-level missions permitted us to assess very accurately and fully the nature of the Soviet MRBM system deployed in Cuba. An engineering sketch of a typical battalion launch site is shown in this particular Vu-Graph.

Notice, if you will, that each of these sites includes four launch positions, one here, another here, another launch position here, and a fourth one at that location. A central propellant area for oxidizer and fuel, usually found near the center of the site areas. In addition, a fence-enclosed warhead storage building, earth covered for hardening purposes, including eight nose-cone vans situated nearby in the center of one of these launch position areas we usually found an erector, a firing position, command and control equipment, as well as two missiles; they are either outside on their transporters or in missile servicing or ready tents.

Gentlemen, the intelligence community reported that on October 28, 1962, the Soviets did achieve a full operational capability for all MRBM facilities in Cuba. This is on the morning of the 28th that this report is being made.

In addition, they report that based on an analysis of the rate of construction they observed at the IRBM sites the Soviets are aiming toward full operational capability for all IRBM facilities by December 15, 1962.

The irony of this particular graphic is this: The intelligence analysts reported, based on their study of the photography, that the Soviets on this date had reached full operational readiness for their MRBM sites.

As you know now, and as I know, Mr. Khrushchev on October 28, 1962, agreed to dismantle these bases that on that date were just completed.

The job that now confronted the reconnaissance planners in the military department was to determine a means to monitor the dismantling of the IR and MRBM sites in Cuba, and to verify the removal of the missile components from the island. This was done in three ways: First, low altitude aircraft swept in over the nine offensive missile bases to observe and monitor dismantling; second, high altitude aircraft swept the islands to monitor where this equipment was being moved and to insure that it was being moved to the port areas and being loaded on Soviet ships. This second phase was also assisted by low altitude reconnaissance.

And third, as these ships departed the island of Cuba, they were monitored by U.S. surface craft and aircraft, and the missiles were inspected on the decks.

Gentlemen, this is a low altitude photograph acquired on October 29 over one of the MRBM site areas, No. 3, at San Cristobal. We did notice a change the day after Mr. Khrushchev made his announcement.

If you will notice, the erectors have been removed from their firing positions. They have been drawn back. Missile transporters that were in formerly ready locations have been pulled out of these locations, and there has been reduction in the readiness of these particular sites. We can't account for these changes at this particular time, but during the next few days we do observe dynamic changes.

The Soviets dismantle the MR and IRBM bases. On November 1 we cover Sagua La Grande, where two launch positions are observed and where just 74 hours earlier we had rated this base as fully operational. Note that it is completely clear of all cabling and operational equipment. This base or launching position has also been cleared.

Note, if you will, that all that remains in this site area on November 1 is a single military convoy collecting the remaining equipment and debris from the area, about to move away from this site location.

Ladies and gentlemen, in addition to moving equipment away from the MRBM launch sites, the Soviets methodically destroyed the fixed facilities in the vicinity of the firing position. This is San Cristobal site No. 2. A few days earlier this was a concrete launch pad. This area also was a concrete launch pad. Soviet bulldozers have churned back and forth, disrupting the earth and leaving only chunks of concrete remaining. Soviet bulldozers at this location have churned back and forth and broken up these sites so that all that remain are chunks of concrete.

The sites were destroyed in this manner at the MRBM facilities. Note, if you will, that a missile ready tent is just being collapsed at the time of photography. One side is sagging and in a few hours we will observe this one removed.

In addition to removing equipment from the site areas, and in addition to destroying the fixed facilities in the vicinity of the launching positions, the Soviets carefully cleared all the remaining operational equipment and debris from their site locations.

This is Sagua La Grande site No. 2. Just a few days earlier it was fully operational. Cabling had connected with an erector at this location. Command and control equipment was found in this area. Missile ready tents with missiles in them were found at this location.

Command and control equipment and other servicing gear were also noted. By this date, all of this has been removed.

There were camouflage in these areas. There were palm branches that the Soviets had cut from trees and stuck into the road area in order to break up the reflection we were acquiring with our photography. All these were dozed away and swept clean.

On this date, November 3, all that remained was a Soviet single dump truck moving slowly through this area, picking up the remaining debris with a police crew in apparent anticipation of moving from the site area.

The job of dismantling the IRBM sites was one somewhat different than that required for the dismantling of the MRBM sites. Here the Soviets did not have a road system and did not have any operational equipment yet deployed at these locations and nonetheless they did have certain fixed facilities, launching pads, connecting cable lines, controlling bunkers, and so on. This is one of the IRBM sites. It is Remedios, 160 miles east of Havana. This again is a former launch position observed on November 9 with low altitude photography.

A Soviet bulldozer has churned back and forth and destroyed this launching pad. The conduits that extended for the cabling from the launch pad area here to the control bunker here have been ripped from the ground and they have broken up and destroyed and even the trench have been carefully graded and filled by Soviet bulldozers.

The sites at Guanajay No. 1 and Guanajay No. 2 were also broken up in a similar manner.

Gentlemen, in addition to calling for the dismantling of Soviet missile sites in Cuba, and in addition to calling for removal of Soviet offensive missiles and components from the island, the President announced on October 22 that he would invoke or establish a quarantine of the island to prevent the arrival of additional offensive equipment.

At that particular time, 18 Soviet dry cargo ships were en route to the island of Cuba. Of these 18, 5 included the large-hatch type.

After the President's announcement and after the establishment of the quarantine, 16 of these ships reversed course and returned to the Soviet Union. I might say they were carefully followed coming over and carefully followed going back by the U.S. naval surface craft and aircraft. They were followed back into the Baltic Sea and followed back into the Mediterranean. It was quite interesting to note that 5 of the 16 ships that reversed course included the large-hatch type.

The job again confronting the reconnaissance planners during this particular phase was to insure that the missile equipment, the missile components being removed from the launch site areas was being taken to ports and removed from the island of Cuba and not simply being redeployed at some other location or hidden at some other location.

High-altitude aircraft swept the island, and all of the naval facilities and seaports were carefully checked. Approach roadways were followed, and the Soviet equipment as it left the nine respective site areas, was monitored as it moved into the port areas of Cuba.

Equipment in central Cuba, from the offensive bases deployed in central Cuba, was evacuated from the island, from La Isabela in the north, and Casilda port in the south. Offensive missile equipment

that was deployed in the San Cristobal area here located southwest of Havana and Guanajay just west of Havana, was evacuated through the port of Mariel. The Soviets employed the ships that they had in the harbors of Cuba at the particular time to remove these offensive weapons from the island.

Here is an example. This is the port of Mariel, as it appeared on November 2, 1962. Three Soviet ships are here. A few weeks ago they brought equipment to the island. They are resting high in the water. They are being assigned the task at about this time to remove the offensive missile equipment from the island. On this date the first advance convoys of the equipment from the San Cristobal IRBM sites begin to arrive.

In addition, other equipment has already been brought into the area, is nearing the ships, and is about to be loaded onto the ships themselves. The metal rings and launch stands that were ripped from the concrete pads are shown at these locations prior to their being loaded onto the ships.

Ladies and gentlemen, the United States did not just insure that the missile alone left the island of Cuba. We insured that the missile system left the island of Cuba. All components of that system were carefully counted as they left the site area, as they reached the port motor pools, and as they were loaded on Soviet ships.

Here is one of the parking areas near the port of Mariel, one of the pier areas. Here we observe and carefully count with our low-altitude photography, the Soviet oxidizer trailers from the MRBM sites, the Soviet fueling trailers from the MRBM sites, other fueling and oxidizer trailers being shown at this location, the specially configured IRBM fueling trailer noted at Guanajay No. 1. They are also counted and tabulated as they move into the area prior to shipment away from the island. Missiles, including four MRBM's under canvas cover on a transporter, are noted in the upper left corner of the photograph.

The other key components are checked as they leave the island. In the San Cristobal area there were 16 launch sites and 16 erectors. The equipment from San Cristobal moved to Mariel.

Here we observe 17 missile erectors from the San Cristobal area, each with their launch stands, prior to being loaded on Soviet ships that are moving in one by one to take over the offensive equipment.

Note, if you will, the special nose cone bands and other special support equipment are also observed in this particular area, and carefully counted as they leave the island.

In addition to following the port areas, and in addition to carefully recovering the offensive missile bases to insure equipment is removed, we covered the approach roadways between the sites and the ports. We catch the Soviets on the road, we catch them in overnight bivouacs, like the one shown here near Trinidad. This is a Soviet missile equipment and temporary storage area just north of the port of Casilda.

Twelve missile transporters from the Sagua La Grande area are waiting their turn to move the 12 miles south to be loaded on Soviet ships. Note the other components, including oxidizer trailers, cranes, servicing vehicles, et cetera.

A few days later we check the port of Casilda, on November 6. The MRBM missiles on transporters have been moved southward from that temporary storage area and six have been placed on the

Soviet ship *Kurchator*. Here are the six missiles under canvas cover and loaded on this particular ship. The ship is nearing the completion of its loading cycle. The forward hatch covers are closed. The rear hatches are being closed. Here Soviet crewmen and technicians await in line or go up the gangway in loading the ship itself.

Note the ship is under steam and about to move away. We will observe this ship leave this harbor area in a few hours. This shadow is cast by an RF-101 reconnaissance aircraft as it moves in over its target area at 600 feet.

The next day, the *Kurchator* leaves and another ship moves in, the *Komsomol*. Here again we had this type of photograph to see what the Soviets were loading on their ships, and to insure that, indeed, the missile systems were leaving the island.

We can carefully monitor the erectors pulled down from Sagua La Grande, count them, and see them loaded on the ships. We can actually see into the holds of these Soviet ships and see the equipment, which includes fueling trailers already placed there by large cranes.

Back at Mariel, the three Soviet ships that had been riding high in the water are now nearly fully loaded. The Soviet ship *Grotz* is standing off in the center of the harbor area. The *Diunogorsk* is shown in the upper right area maneuvering to another location to pick up another missile on its deck. It already has three MRBM's loaded. The *Anasor* shown here has six MRBM's loaded; they are already deckloaded. Two more MRBM's will be loaded on this ship prior to its departure from the Mariel area.

Here they are, awaiting their turn to be moved up into the ship area, and when the hatches are closed, these are finally lifted on the deck of the *Arason*. When the *Arason* departs Mariel, it will carry eight missile transporters, it will carry eight Soviet MRBM's. These eight are shown on the deck of the ship itself, wrapped under canvas cover. Note if you will, that cranes, other supporting equipment, oxidizers transfer vessel, erectors, and cherrypickers and other particular or unique equipment associated with the MRBM site are also deckloaded.

When these ships reach the area of the quarantine, they encountered U.S. surface craft and aircraft inspection. As you note the U.S. destroyer 878 pulls alongside the Soviet ship *Volgoles*, the Soviet crewmen tear back the tarpaulin cover, exposing the Soviet MRBM on transporter beneath.

A helicopter stands off the Soviet ship *Brotsk* and here the tarpaulin cover has been pulled back, exposing the Soviet MRBM ballistic booster, minus nose cone. It measures 60 feet in length and it is tightly wrapped in all-weather protective covering.

Note the cable trench that we carefully measured, which terminates at its precise point, the carbon veins, the missile fins, and all the detail of the erector transporter as it is shown deckloaded on the Soviet ship *Brotsk*. These ships, all eight of them, are followed by U.S. surface craft and aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean, into the Baltic Sea, the Danish Straits, into the Mediterranean Sea, and on to the Black Sea to their home waters. This is a photograph, one of many we have, acquired by U.S. naval reconnaissance aircraft of the *Komsomol* in the Mediterranean on November 19, 1962, with its deckload of eight medium-range ballistic missiles, going home from Cuba.

The Soviets removed their 42 missiles from Cuba on these 8 ships in these numbers, from these ports, on these dates, November 5 through 9.

The next most serious problem confronting the United States following the removal of the offensive missiles from the island of Cuba, was the continued deployment and assembly of the Soviet Beagle IL-28 bomber. This particular bomber could carry a bomb load in excess of 6,000 pounds to ranges out to a radius of about 600 nautical miles. It could reach key target areas in the southeastern United States. Forty-two of these unassembled bombers were delivered to the island of Cuba. Thirty-three were delivered to San Julian Airfield in western Cuba, and the other nine were delivered unassembled to Holguin Airfield in east central Cuba.

We were a bit more fortunate with regard to being forewarned insofar as the offensive bombers were concerned than we were with regard to the offensive missiles. Observed on the deck of a Soviet ship, *Kasimov*, on September 28, 1962, were 10 large shipping crates, and the ship is approaching Cuba. Eight of them are shown here and two more were observed at these locations.

We carefully studied these crates. We frankly didn't know what they included. After a very careful assessment of these crates, and a very careful assessment of the characteristics of various Soviet aircraft and other types of equipment, it was judged that the *Kasimov* was carrying Soviet IL-28 bombers to Cuba on this particular date. A report to that effect was released on October 9, 1962.

These crates were delivered to San Julian Airfield, for when our high-altitude aircraft covered the airfield on October 15, 21 of these 60-foot-long crates were found parked in the central area. They measured 60 feet in length and were similarly configured to those observed on the Soviet ship *Kasimov*. In addition, one of the crates had been broken open, exposing a 58-foot-long fuselage, conforming to the configuration of the IL-28 bomber.

During the next few days and weeks, we observed with high- and low-altitude photography the progress of the Soviets and the Cubans in assembling these particular bombers. As I mentioned earlier, at San Julian Airfield, 33 of these unassembled bombers were delivered in crates. Of these 33, 13 were broken out from the crates and assembly begun. Of these 13, 7 reached final assembly stages and were considered as flyable, and of these 7, 4 were considered to be the trainer version.

So, frankly, the Soviets and the Cubans never reached full or operational status or readiness with their offensive bombers on the island of Cuba prior to their being removed. This low-altitude photograph, taken on October 27, shows you the detail we can acquire with regard to monitoring the stages of assembly here. The Beagle aircraft being assembled at this location—this one is minus the tail section or the horizontal stabilizer.

Notice, if you will, the engine mounts are being emplaced at this location, while other aircraft components, including tail sections, wings, and a partially completed aircraft are observed in the field area. We carefully watched these aircraft and the field as well, and monitored day by day the progress the Soviets were making in the assembly of these airplanes.

They responded again to our low-altitude reconnaissance efforts. They threw canvas, tarpaulins, and nets over their assembly activities. They took the 20 remaining crates and dispersed them throughout the airfield and threw camouflage nets across them. But the one thing you must understand here is that with extremely low-altitude, high-resolution photographs, even the activities of the Soviets beneath the camouflage netting cannot be denied.

Chairman Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the bombers and remove them from the island on November 20. The job, again, of the reconnaissance aircraft was to provide the means or to be the means to monitor disassembly of the bombers and to verify the removal of the components from the islands.

High- and low-altitude aircraft continued after the 20th to cover San Julian Airfield and Holguin Airfield. Frankly, some additional assembly and construction was noted. But on November 25 the first evidence of disassembly was noted. On this high-altitude photograph you can see Soviet IL-28 bombers. Now the wings have been separated from the fuselages, and engines have been separated from the wings. In addition, the 20 aircraft crates that have been dispersed throughout the airfield area itself are now being collected along a central taxiway, apparently in preparation for movement away from the airfield.

By December 4, low-altitude coverage of the San Julian area reveals that in this region and in the overall airfield and in its environs, the IL-28 bomber aircraft and its components have been removed.

At Holguin, as I mentioned earlier, nine IL-28 fuselage crates, shown here on this photograph, and the smaller component crates for engines and electrical equipment were delivered to the island on November 4. This photograph was acquired on November 5. By November 27 these large crates and the component crates were removed from the Holguin Airfield.

Again, the high-altitude aircraft swept the island. They swept the port areas to determine which ones would be used for the removal of Soviet offensive bombers from the island. They checked the railroads and railheads. Finally it was found that the Soviets were moving the Soviet fuselages from Holguin to the port of Nuevitas, and the bombers located in western Cuba were being moved to the port of Mariel.

The Soviet ship *Ikhotsk* pulled into the port of Mariel and picked up three of the IL-28 bomber fuselages. It moved along the north coast of Cuba to the port of Nuevitas where it picked up the nine crated IL-28 bombers from the Holguin Airfield. When this ship departed Cuba on December 5, it carried 12 of the Soviet offensive bombers. This particular photograph was taken as the ship, after picking up three of the bombers at Mariel, is now moving to the port of Nuevitas.

Here it is at Nuevitas, viewed with high-altitude photography, picking up the remaining crates. Four are already deck loaded and the remaining five in the dock area.

The Soviet ship *Kasimon* departs Mariel on December 5 with 15 more IL-28 bombers, deck loaded. Eleven are in crates and four are under canvas cover at these locations.

The remaining 15 bombers are observed parked in the outer area at Mariel port. Five of them are not crated. The remaining 10 are. The Soviet ship *Krasnograd*, a large hatch ship, pulls into the Mariel

area. Its hatches are open. It is being readied for loading. This ship will depart Cuba on December 7 with these 15 bombers.

Gentlemen, these ships when they reach the area of the quarantine are inspected by U.S. naval surface craft and aircraft. Here in response to a request of the captain of the Soviet ship, that he permit inspection and counting of the Soviet bombers, the Soviet captain directs that the crews dismantle on the decks of the ships the shipping crates. The end sections are pulled off, and the top sections are stripped back, exposing the IL-28 fuselage jet.

Gentlemen, all 42 bombers observed in Cuba that were later observed deck loaded on Soviet ships were inspected in this manner, and all 42 of them, some of which were in crates, were fully exposed as they departed Cuba.

With regard to the bomber threat, then, three Soviet ships, the *Okhotsk*, *Kasimov*, and *Krasnograd*, removed the 42 bombers observed at San Julian and Holguin Airfield from the island of Cuba. Ports selected were Nuevitas and Mariel, and these ships departed Cuba on these particular dates.

I might mention at this time that all other airfields in Cuba were under continuous and constant surveillance. These aircraft were not moved to other airfields. They were moved to these port areas, and loaded on these three ships.

No complete appreciation for what the Soviets intended in Cuba as a prime offensive base could be had unless we fully understand the nature and extent of the deployment of Soviet defensive systems to the island.

The Soviets deployed five categories of defensive weapons systems on the island beginning sometime in August and September.

The air defense systems deployed included the surface-to-air missiles known as the SA-2. It also included the high performance interceptor fighters known as the Mig 21.

Key or critical possible areas were protected by coastal defense crews missile systems deployed at four known and an additional possible location. In addition, guided missile patrol boats provided a mobile launching capability for antishipping work with 12 Komar class boats were delivered to the island.

And, finally, Soviet ground forces at four locations have also been identified on the island of Cuba, and their equipment are still found on the island.

This graph depicts the deployment of the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles on the island of Cuba. These 24 locations, each one marked in red, are characterized by 6 launching or firing sites. The system can reach out to ranges of 30 nautical miles, and you see the interlocking fan providing continuous cover of the north coast of Cuba effected with this particular system.

Notice, if you will, key areas of southern Cuba are also provided protection. This weapon can reach to altitudes of 80,000 feet.

The first evidence of Soviet surface-to-air deployment in Cuba came with high altitude photography acquired on August 29, 1962. At that time, in the vicinity of Havana, a half dozen or so sites were uncovered. Again, the emphasis was placed upon the field expedient. The Soviets quickly moved in and set six circular firing points around a centrally positioned guidance area. A temporary service road was constructed, and a local capability was attempted for this particular site area.

When they had time, the Soviets improved their surface-to-air missile sites, as observed on October 23 on this low altitude view of Bahia Honda. Now, a revetment now encloses each of the firing positions.

In addition, the central guidance area is also reveted, and concrete hardstands have been placed beneath the erectors and launchers and camouflage and cover is provided over each of the launch positions and in the vicinity of the centrally positioned guidance radar.

Color photography was employed with great success over these locations in Cuba. Here is a color view of the Soviet SAM site at La Coloma, again with the road path torn, and the six firing positions focused on a centrally located guidance area. Notice, if you will, that three missiles are uncovered; one here, another here, and another here. They measure 33.7 feet in length and have two stages. Note again, if you will, three other missiles are under canvas cover, a standard Soviet practice.

In addition to the deployment of surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets also deployed in Cuba the Fishbeds, the Mig-21 fighter-interceptor. This particular aircraft is equipped with air-to-air missiles, can reach altitudes of 40,000 feet and speeds of 1,000 knots.

The Mig-21 aircraft was initially deployed at Santa Clara Airfield. It came unassembled. It was assembled at Santa Clara, and later we observed them being redeployed to San Antonio de los Bonos in the west and Camia Airfield in the east.

This photograph was acquired on September 5, 1962, a high-altitude photograph. It is the first photograph we have indicating or proving that the Soviets were deploying a Mig-21 type aircraft in Cuba. Here is the delta-wing configured aircraft, and this enlargement is several hundred times, near four aircraft shipping crates or boxes.

During the next 6 or 7 weeks these Mig-21 aircraft were assembled at a rapid clip. In the period between September 5 and October 17, 38 additional aircraft were assembled, so that by this date, October 17, 39 were observed in line along the runway area. Older Mig-15 aircraft given to the Cubans by the Soviets were also identified at this field.

That the Mig-21 aircraft were flyable was proven by two points. First of all, as shown here, they could be observed taking off from the runway, as one is here at Santa Clara on October 18. Note the delta-wing aircraft with its shadow cast along the runway, just as it leaves the runway in takeoff. These aircraft, as I mentioned, were also deployed at two other fields.

On November 10, low-altitude photography provided us something interesting and new concerning the Soviet Mig-21 aircraft in Cuba. We found, interestingly enough, near these aircraft, on this date, air-to-air missiles. Here is the AA-2, a Soviet air-to-air missile with a range of 6 nautical miles. It is positioned near the delta-winged or configured Mig-21 aircraft. The Soviet crew is placing a rack below the aircraft. The missile will be appended to this rack, as it is already appended to the racks in the wings of these other locations. In addition to employing the Mig-21 in Cuba, the Soviets were affording it an additional weapons capability, that is, the air-to-air missile.

Key beach areas in Cuba are defended by coast defensive missiles. These missiles are aerodynamically configured and have a range of 40 nautical miles. We have four operational sites, one at Banes in eastern Cuba, one at Sigüanea, and two near Havana, Santa Cruz del

Norte and Campo Florida. A fifth site has also been identified west of the Havana area.

An excellent photograph of one of the operational sites is shown at Siguanea, on the Isle of Pines. Here they have taken the highest site, and dozed it down, and then chose two earth positions, both of which were reveled. Inside is the 34-foot-long rail launcher uncovered at this location and canvas-covered at this location.

Note the guidance area where command control and cabling is effected from this camouflaged and concealed sector. Because these areas were so close to the beach, so close to the sea, they were vulnerable to attack. The Soviets therefore constructed trenches, Soviet personnel trenches, automatic firing weapons, to afford defense.

In addition, to the left in this photograph seven of the cruise missiles on transporters can be observed.

The guided missile patrol craft *Komar* was observed at two locations in Cuba, one at Mariel in the west, where eight were identified, and Banes in the east, where four were identified.

We noted these boats patrolling back and forth, but we feel that eight are stationed at the Mariel area and four in the area of Banes.

This is a photograph of the improved naval base at Banes.

Again, observe the date of this photograph, November 3. A barracks building has been completed, a typical Soviet-type building, and a missile servicing tent 60 feet in length, a drive-through type, as well as cruise missile crates for the missiles fired from the four *Komar* guided missile patrol boats parked in the pier areas to the left.

This is an enlargement of that pier area, from our low-altitude photography. The boats, *Komar* boats, measure 83 feet in length. They weigh 66 tons and on the aft end they have 2 missile firing cannisters. These cannisters measure 20 feet in length. The missile fired from this boat is estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 nautical miles. It is primarily a mobile antishipping missile launching platform.

Soviet ground forces were deployed in Cuba some time after mid-September, the first photographic evidence we have of these ground force locations came on October 17. They are deployed at four major and several smaller locations. Each of these locations is characterized by highly mobile armored task groups. They included assault guns, tanks, tactical rocket launchers, antitank weapons, and a motorized infantry battalion. Note, if you will, that Artemisa Garrison was designed to protect or provide coverage for the western sector of Cuba, where MRBM bases were located.

The Remedios Garrison was designed to protect the central sector of the island of Cuba. The Holguin Garrison was designed to serve as required in the eastern sector of the island. And then, apparently just in case they might be needed right on the outskirts of Havana, at Santiago de las Vegas, was another Soviet garrison area.

High-altitude photography was and is being acquired over these garrison points. Frankly, initially when we saw these garrison locations, we thought that these were tent areas or maybe Cuba militia and much of the equipment arriving in these site areas might be Soviet equipment going to be given to the Cubans.

We carefully, though, checked the character of this equipment with our low-altitude photography and we could only say they were probably tanks, probably mortars with high-altitude photography. Great detail could be discerned with our low-altitude materials. No

longer was it a question of whether they were mortars; it was what was their caliber.

Here are Soviet 6,000-yard, 120-millimeter mortars, the base plate, the tube and the mountings, all very clearly discernible. Seven of them observed in line. The prime movers and Soviet servicing vehicles are also found in this location.

In addition at these four locations we find the modern Soviet T-54 tank, with 100-millimeter gun, 35 to 40 of these tanks are identified at each of the locations. Here are the T-54 tanks under canvas cover, and here are the T-54 tanks uncovered with hatches open, Soviet crews working on them, and tubes being rotated. The date of the photography is November 6. This is the kind of quality we had with the low-altitude materials.

In addition to finding modern tanks and mortars at these Soviet ground force garrison areas, each of which had anywhere from 1,000 to 1,250 men, more modern Soviet ground force fighting equipment was also observed. This photograph was taken in Moscow on November 7, 1962. This is the Kremlin wall, and here the Soviets proudly display their Frog 3 and 4. The Frog is "free rocket over ground." It is like our own Honest John. Here is a Frog 3 at this location with bulbous warhead, and Frog 4 at this location. Both of these weapons are mounted on a PT-76 amphibious tank chassis.

In Cuba, on October 25, our low-altitude aircraft found the same weapons system deployed. Here is the launcher and the Frog at Remedios. Here is the refire missile and the missile transporter, along with your associated guidance equipment.

Notice, if you will, on this graphic other more modern Soviet equipment, including five 130-millimeter rocket launchers, the standard SU-100 assault gun, and other T-54 tanks under canvas cover.

The Frog missile transporters and launchers, once our low-altitude reconnaissance began, were carefully hidden by the Soviets. They secured them behind fences, as is shown by this particular photograph, and they either camouflaged them or placed them under clumps of trees, as is shown by this particular photograph. Note the six missile transporters tucked beneath the trees but still discernible on low-altitude photography.

In addition to the tactical Frog rocket launcher which could reach ranges no greater than 25 nautical miles, the Soviets also deployed in Cuba an antitank weapon that was a fairly modern and new one, nicknamed the Snapper. This particular vehicle was mounted on a scout car, and it included a triple pylon launch structure. There are three rails, and appended to each of these rails is a Soviet missile which is wire-guided. This particular photograph was taken in Moscow on November 7, 1962.

On November 6, 1962, these same weapons were observed at one of the garrison areas in Cuba. Here again are your Snappers in line, eight of them. Notice, if you will, the rear section of this Snapper weapon has been raised back. The three launcher rails are clearly visible, as they are on this particular weapon. The Snapper back section is just being raised on this location. It is closed at this location. No doubt, modern Soviet equipment and Soviet ground forces in Cuba.

In addition to the deployment of the modern weapons in Cuba, the Soviet garrison commanders, like any good garrison commander had, in flagstone and flower, implanted the front of their garrison areas,

and these are recently completed barracks buildings, the insignia or symbols of the Soviet units. Here is the symbol of the Soviet Armored Forces, the symbol of the Soviet Infantry Forces, the infantry leaf, and this particular unit has been awarded the equivalent of the Presidential Citation, the Elite Guards Badge.

These areas have been dressed up and fairly well improved, nice surfaced roads and more permanent buildings constructed at this location.

In summary, ladies and gentlemen, the Soviet Union introduced into Cuba eight categories of modern offensive and defensive weapons systems, which we are confident were maintained under the direct control of the Soviet forces in Cuba.

At the height of the Soviet buildup in Cuba, in late October, the order of battle situation reflecting the various locations where Soviet offensive and defensive systems were deployed was as shown by this graphic.

Since October 28 when Chairman Khrushchev agrees to remove certain weapons systems, our aerial reconnaissance has permitted us to verify (1), the dismantling of the MRBM bases and removal of the missiles and key system components from the island; (2), the dismantling of the IRBM bases and the removal of the IRBM operational support equipment; and, (3), the dismantling and removal of the IL-28 bombers. Along with this equipment removed from Cuba, we estimate that 5,000 Soviet soldiers and technicians have also departed the island. Remaining in Cuba, therefore, are the defensive weapons systems shown here at their deployed locations, along with the approximately 17,000 Soviet troops and technicians.

In addition to carefully monitoring the remaining defensive forces on the island of Cuba, the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft have effected continuous surveillance of former Soviet offensive missile and bomber bases.

As late as Monday, February 4, these areas were inactive, still dismantled and marked by no military activity.

I would like very quickly to review three or four of our most recent photographs of Soviet ports and the former offensive missile bases.

We have covered as late as February 4 and have been continuously covering up to that time, the former offensive missile bases in Cuba. These particular bases continued to remain dismantled, and there is no evidence whatever that there is any effort on the part of the Soviets or of the Cubans to reestablish them.

As the President indicated, a single Soviet ship had apparently come to Cuba, possibly bringing arms to the island. I want to give you some idea of the intensive reconnaissance effort we direct against Soviet shipping reaching the island of Cuba.

This is the Soviet ship in question, the *Simferopol*. It is docked at Havana port. Our aircraft are covering it nine times during the period of its unloading. Our photo interpreters carefully monitor and describe the types of unloading equipment the Soviets or Cubans have brought into this area. We measure the boxes and the crates that are being taken off the ship. None of the boxes or crates, none of the vehicles observed in this area, are capable in our judgment, of supporting any type of offensive weapon systems. They are all in the general category of 20 or 21 feet in length or smaller. Most of the vehicles observed unloading equipment are 2½ ton, 5-ton type, open-bed or flatbed trailers.

In addition to covering, say, the port of Havana, we carefully and continually watch the port of Mariel. This is the main area where the Soviets brought much of their equipment to Cuba, we believe, and the primary area where much of it has been removed. This is the port of Mariel a week ago Sunday as it appeared on January 26. This is the pier or port area where those three Soviet ships had been docked. The area where much of the equipment had been laid out in the open is now white and clear. There is no activity in and around this particular area.

This is La Boca pier, in this area through here, where two more berthing points have been used by the Soviets. These also are not marked by any activity at this particular date.

This photograph was taken of the La Boca pier area on December 27, 1962. Again our aircraft are sweeping back and forth and observed this Soviet ship moving into the harbor area from out in the ocean sector. At that time, we also observed parked at dockside 10 probable Frog missile transporters along with their support equipment. This ship pulled in, this equipment was apparently loaded, and moved away from the La Boca pier area. This is one of the first photographs that we have firming up at least the fact that some of the Soviet tactical rocket forces have departed the island.

Gentlemen, if I might just recall your attention to the earlier photograph shown here of the Guanajay site No. 1, here are two fixed launch positions. Here is the concrete ring set in the center of a concrete pad. Here is a nice, straight cable conduit leading to the control bunker here, and the control bunker here, and here is the pad area being worked on at the height of the buildup.

This is the area observed from high altitude photography as it appeared on January 26, off in the upper left sector. Notice, if you will, that the concrete pads that were destroyed during that period still remain destroyed, and that the control bunkers and conduits that are noted in this particular area are essentially the same as they were when we noted them destroyed on our low altitude photography in early November. There is no essential change, no evidence of occupants or activity at this particular location.

This photograph we showed you of the MRBM launch site No. 3 at San Cristobal, after the Soviets in the background had made the site launching facilities more permanent, had begun construction of their nuclear warhead storage building. I reported to you that they even now had time to work on permanent barracks buildings.

I would like to show you a photograph of this area as it appeared a week ago Sunday or Monday.

Here is the San Cristobal site on January 27. All the equipment has been moved from the area. The remains of the broken-up pads are still evident in the area. There is no attempt by anyone to reactivate the firing positions at these particular locations. In addition, when the Soviets moved away, they did not have time to dismantle the barrack buildings that they just finished prior to destruction of the site, but during the period since the Soviets have moved from the area, we have noted that these prefabricated barrack buildings, apparently a high priority item in Cuba, have either been vandalized or taken away by the Cubans, and now even the barrack buildings that used to be in the area after the Soviets left have been completely removed.

There is no evidence of antiaircraft artillery or any occupants in this particular sector. I might say that we could show you the nine offensive missile bases with this type comparative photography.

In addition, ladies and gentlemen, there is little doubt that the Soviet Union did embark upon a bold venture to establish clandestinely a major offensive weapons base in the Western Hemisphere. That the United States was able to deter this effort and is now able to monitor the remaining defensive forces is in large part attributable to the reconnaissance photography that we have reviewed this afternoon. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hughes, for a magnificent presentation. It gives the committee members all of the information they desire.

I will request if there are any questions by any members of the committee to the witness or to the Secretary or to General Carroll.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. I would like to ask a question of either General Taylor, Secretary McNamara, General Carroll, or this young man. You say there are 17,000 Soviets on the island. That is, of course, a horseback number.

There are at least 42 Mig's of varying categories. They are fighting bombers. They have an altitude of 50,000 or 60,000 plus. They are the latest they have.

Are they really defensive weapons?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Rivers, the character of those aircraft are such that they have very little, if any, offensive capability against this Nation.

They cannot penetrate our defense other than at low altitude, if at all. The low altitude substantially reduces their range.

Mr. RIVERS. That is the Mig 21?

Secretary McNAMARA. The Mig 21.

Mr. RIVERS. A radius of [deleted] nautical miles?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

General CARROLL. That would be when configured in the fighter bomber role, sir.

When configured as a fighter interceptor and with external tanks they do have an optimum radius with a normal load of [deleted].

Mr. RIVERS. [Deleted] miles there and [deleted] miles back?

General CARROLL. At high altitude.

Secretary McNAMARA. They cannot be expected to attack the United States at high altitude. Our defenses are such they could not penetrate.

General CARROLL. This is when they are configured as a fighter interceptor.

Mr. RIVERS. Then at high altitude they would be only a reconnaissance plane?

Secretary McNAMARA. Or fighter interceptor; yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. At [deleted] miles it would give them a range to Florida?

Secretary McNAMARA. General Carroll has a map on these ranges. If you would care to have him come up to the bench and show you.

Mr. RIVERS. What I was trying to develop was, there are not any offensive weapons, so far as you know, or anybody else knows, remaining on the island of Cuba?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; as far as I know there is not.

Mr. RIVERS. Then there are no missiles of any category other than what you call those Snappers?

Secretary McNAMARA. There are five categories of missiles that have been listed as remaining on the island.

The surface-to-air missile, the air-to-air missile carried by the Mig 21's, the coastal defense missiles, the KOMAR patrol boat missile, and the ground-to-ground tactical missile, but no missiles, that we know of, capable of being launched against our shores.

Mr. RIVERS. It is your opinion that nothing in Cuba is operated by Cubans?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that the majority of the military equipment in Cuba is operated by Cubans, but a major part of the equipment discussed with you today, the medium tanks, certain of the artillery pieces, and certain other systems, are operated by the 17,000 Soviet military personnel we believe to be in Cuba.

Mr. RIVERS. So we have 17,000 Soviets in Cuba who are performing a military mission?

Secretary McNAMARA. We believe so.

Mr. RIVERS. And they have the latest category of weapons you say for defense?

Secretary McNAMARA. We believe so.

Mr. RIVERS. Plus highly trained combat soldiers as well as technicians.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman—

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. Can I follow that up with a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. What is the basis for the concern about the recent buildup in Cuba—whether it is defensive or what not?

I had some conversations just this past week—

The CHAIRMAN. Talk a little louder, Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. I had some conversations just this past week with business people who are traveling that whole Caribbean area and they paint a rather sad picture of the intensive buildup still going on. Is it also defensive? Or do we know?

Or do we know the extent of it?

Is there an increase, current increase, in Soviet troop buildup in Cuba?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Hardy, I don't believe that there has been a substantial increase in either the buildup of Soviet personnel in Cuba or the deliveries of Soviet equipment to Cuba in recent weeks.

There has been one ship, which we believe may have carried arms to Cuba and which landed recently. But I would like General Carroll to comment on this.

Mr. HARDY. I wish he would.

I was down in the Caribbean area when the picture of this particular ship appeared in the press down there, and the general expression of people in that area was that this was just one of a number of ships that had been in and out of there.

I wish General Carroll would comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please comment, General Carroll?

General CARROLL. I would like to invite your attention to the photography just displayed and the kind of information that we can derive from that.

We continue to maintain very extensive photographic coverage of every square inch of that island.

That, coupled with other information, has not as yet given us any reason to believe that there has been any continued substantial buildup, either by way of equipment or personnel, of the forces in Cuba.

Mr. HARDY. Just to follow up, General: First of all, have there been substantial numbers of other Russian ships besides this one that have been unloading and discharging in Cuba the last couple or 2 or 3 weeks, and if so, do we have conclusive evidence that they did not carry military supplies?

[Answer deleted.]

Mr. HARDY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hardy.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Secretary, I think this recitation this morning and the information we have just received once again pinpoints the enormity of the debacle of the Bay of Pigs.

No one wants that to happen again.

I recall vividly, as you do—you were there and so was the chairman—when the question was raised as to when a defensive weapon becomes an offensive weapon. The only feeling I have is that somewhere along the line someplace we failed quick enough to recognize this difference.

I don't know where. I am not being critical personally. It seems that this whole matter arose too quickly, too much happened too fast, and that somewhere we failed to keep pace with it.

Let me ask you a couple of questions, if I may.

The U-2 flights—which started, in my humble opinion, probably too late—have the U-2's been fired upon more than once, to your knowledge?

We say we lost possibly one U-2.

Have we been fired on once or repeatedly?

Secretary McNAMARA. First, let me say that these U-2 flights, of course, have been carried on regularly.

I mention this in relation to your comment that the U-2 reconnaissance started too late. It has been carried on regularly, both before October 14 and since then.

I would like to ask General Taylor and General Carroll to check my own memory about the number of attacks on U-2's over Cuba.

My recollection is that we had only one incident.

Max, you may wish to correct me.

General TAYLOR. [Deleted.]

Mr. ARENDS. Then we came to the conclusion that something really important was happening in Cuba, although belatedly.

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't believe, personally, that we came to that conclusion belatedly.

One of the startling points, it seems to me, from the briefing this morning, I think, is the rapidity with which these missile systems were put in place.

As you saw on the September 5 photograph, a field which on October 14 showed a missile system, was absolutely barren. It was only in the October flight that we observed the systems you saw, and, as you

could see from the October 14 and later coverage, the deployment of those systems was just getting underway at that time.

Mr. ARENDS. In your opinion what should we do today?

What is the picture today, with this final inspection, and with the information we are now able to get with the U-2?

What do we do today, with 17,000 Russians, as Mr. Rivers mentioned, being in there, with offensive weapons, of a limited nature?

What do we do about the picture now in Cuba?

I think the American people are disturbed, and I think rightfully, and I am.

Do we just leave the activity go on the way it is now?

What do you suggest?

What is your frank opinion?

Tell us, frankly, if you feel like it, what you think we should do?

Should we continue to do what we are doing, or should we do more?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think we must maintain continuous surveillance of the entry of Soviet military personnel and equipment into the island to be certain that no offensive weapons systems are reintroduced into the island.

I think, further, that we must take all action that is possible to prevent the export of communism from that island through subversive and covert actions to other parts of the hemisphere.

I think we must make clear to the rest of the hemisphere and to the world that it is our hope and objective to see the overthrow of communism and the reestablishment of a free government in Cuba.

I think we must make the maintenance of a Communist government there as costly to the Soviet Union as we possibly can.

[Deleted.]

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Secretary, when Russia so pleasingly decided to get out of Cuba—is there anything you want to tell us about the agreements that were entered into, just how this was brought about?

Was this by threat of force, invasion, or anything else, that prompted Mr. Khrushchev to say "Well, I will leave now."

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe it was by the controlled application of force and the clear recognition by Khrushchev that we were prepared to exert whatever force was necessary to force them out.

Mr. ARENDS. We really were going to move in on that island then and I think this was good.

I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Philbin,

Mr. PHILBIN. I agree, of course, with the chairman, that this was a very good and comprehensive briefing.

It seems to me, in the first instance, that over a period of time Cuba has been literally turned into an armed camp by the Soviet Union. From these maps and pictures it would seem that these operations and this buildup has gone on for a considerable period of time.

Now, could the Department, or anyone in the room, give us an explanation of how long this buildup was going on, in their considered opinion, and why the buildup was not discovered before?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that the major part of the buildup occurred between July of last year and mid-October. It was known and had been stated publicly before the 1st of July that the Soviets had been supplying military equipment to the Cubans and had been assisting them in the use of such equipment and the training for the

operation of such equipment through the introduction of Soviet military personnel and/or Soviet technicians into Cuba prior to that time.

But the great increase in the number of personnel and the great increase in the quantity of equipment began after the 1st of July.

I will be happy, if you wish, Mr. Chairman, to give to the committee, or introduce into the record, some highly classified figures on the quantities of the major items of equipment on the 1st of July in relation to the quantities that were discussed with you earlier this morning.

Mr. PHILBIN. In other words, you think, and the Department thinks, from your best information, that the real big buildup of these launching pads and medium-range missiles being set up, occurred in the time between July 1, roughly, and the time that you pressed the button on it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. For example, in terms of personnel, I believe there were probably less than 1,000 Soviet personnel there on July 1, compared to 21,000 we believe were there in late October.

Joe, is that a fair statement?

General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. In terms of equipment, for example, I could give you certain specific items of equipment. You may be interested in them.

I have a list of all of the equipment.

Mr. PHILBIN. My point was, it was very surprising to me, and I think to some others, that this buildup could occur so speedily without being discovered, considering the fact that you were conducting surveillance during that period and for some period before the time of the big buildup.

Secretary McNAMARA. The surveillance that was reported on this morning started in detail about August 29, but General Carroll and Mr. Hughes could have started with their reports starting the 1st of July, and there was ample evidence, and we were so informed in the Government, that a substantial introduction of Soviet personnel and arms was taking place following the 1st of July.

Mr. PHILBIN. Prior to the time that you started the aerial surveillance, did not your intelligence forces have information and give you some inkling this big buildup was occurring?

Secretary McNAMARA. We carried on aerial surveillance prior to October regularly and that aerial surveillance did after the 1st of July show the introduction of larger numbers of personnel and larger numbers of equipment.

Mr. PHILBIN. But you think that the major buildup, that is, the buildup that you have demonstrated here this morning, occurred for the most part between July and the time that the crisis developed?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. PHILBIN. Of course, there was a tremendous amount of materiel brought in, these technicians were brought in, and they are still there, and they are not there to twiddle their thumbs.

Now, on another point I would like to have your brief comments. It has been said, with reference to these missiles, these larger ones, that some were being hidden in caves, for example, hidden in out of the way places, and camouflaged so they could not be detected from the air.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. PHILBIN. What would your comment be on that affair?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would reply to those comments in this way, that prior to about September 21 we had received several thousand reports of military equipment being introduced by the Soviets into Cuba and of the several thousand reports there were [deleted] that referred to the introduction of ballistic missiles or long-range missiles into Cuba.

Those were sifted carefully and disproved up until that point because of the difficulty of our sources distinguishing between ballistic missiles, medium range, or intermediate range ballistic missiles, on the one hand, versus the five types of missiles, some of which are very large, 30 or more feet in length, on the other hand—the five types that have been discussed with you this morning, that we believe are still there.

Of those five types, the surface-to-air missile itself, which I believe exceeds 30 feet in length, is probably existing in quantities of several hundred missiles at the present time.

The other four types I would guess offhand, in total, add another several hundred missiles in Cuba.

I would say that there are probably (deleted) missiles in Cuba today, of which a large number is over 30 feet in length and possibly several hundred are stored in the caves which offer natural storage sites, so it seems to me that it is entirely consistent to believe that the offensive missiles that we have referred to have been removed from Cuba, we have seen them removed from Cuba, and at the same time recognize the possible truth of the reports of missiles remaining in Cuba and stored in caves.

Mr. PHILBIN. You don't think any of the offensive missiles are still in Cuba?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do not.

Mr. PHILBIN. They have not been detected?

Secretary McNAMARA. They have not been.

Mr. PHILBIN. You don't think they could be stored in caves like these other missiles?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. PHILBIN. Or otherwise concealed so they are undetected?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do not.

Mr. PHILBIN. And you think that in your normal surveillance operations, if they started a buildup of defensive missiles, that you could detect them in a timely way.

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe so.

Mr. PHILBIN. You don't think there is any concealment measures they could develop or use that would make it impossible for you to detect the presence of these missiles and their buildup, by your surveillance operations?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have a very extensive surveillance.

However, no system of surveillance of the Communist bloc activities can be considered perfect.

Mr. PHILBIN. Right.

Secretary McNAMARA. And I don't wish to indicate that ours is perfect.

On the other hand, I do believe that we can, with respect to objects as large and as complicated and as numerous, taking account of the support equipment, as ballistic missiles systems, I do believe that our system would detect their introduction into Cuba were they to be reintroduced.

Mr. PHILBIN. And your same answer would apply to any larger aircraft?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, it would.

Mr. PHILBIN. And you still propose to continue with the surveillance?

Secretary McNAMARA. We do. The President has so stated that to be our position.

Mr. PHILBIN. You think, so far as you are concerned, it gives you as reasonable a verification of what is going on there as you can get under the circumstances?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do.

Mr. PHILBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gavin?

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Secretary, you said you had the island under surveillance [deleted] and it occurs to me that this is a pretty comprehensive buildup that they have had there, and we did not awaken to the seriousness of the situation until last October. They still have plenty of hardware and material on the island, and still have 17,000 Russians.

Why did we lift our quarantine?

Why don't we continue our quarantine?

We have seen pictures of ships with crates on them, but there was no one on the ships to inspect the crates, to find out whether they were full of straw or whether they actually had missiles in them.

Can you tell us whether or not we boarded these vessels and found out whether the missiles were returned?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Gavin, we showed pictures this morning of the IL-28 crates, for example, which, with the covers removed and the packing cases broken down in the IL-28's showing quite clearly on the decks. We counted exiting from Cuba a number of IL-28's that exactly equaled the number of IL-28's that were either assembled or appeared to be in crates on the airfield and had been observed by our photography.

I personally am completely convinced that all of the IL-28's were removed.

Similarly we counted the number of missiles deployed—IRBM and MRBM—at the sites, and we counted the number on the decks of ships exiting from Cuba.

You saw pictures today of those.

We did not touch them, but we have every reason to believe they were missiles.

It would be impossible for the Soviets to prepare dummies in the very short period of time that elapsed.

Mr. GAVIN. Why didn't we continue our quarantine, or commence it again, to inspect vessels that were going into Cuba to ascertain whether or not hardware or missiles or any materials of warfare were aboard these ships?

Secretary McNAMARA. Because the offensive weapons systems which had been the basis for the establishment of the quarantine were removed and therefore the quarantine was lifted.

Mr. GAVIN. They have still got plenty of hardware over there. The pictures proved that here this morning.

I was surprised at the magnitude of the defense system they had built up and the position they were in that many miles from our shore. Can you tell us why we withdrew our missile bases in Turkey?

The CHAIRMAN. Let's not go over that now.

Mr. GAVIN. I was wondering whether or not they withdrew from Cuba and we from a defensive position in Turkey.

Is there any connection between the two?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, may I answer this last question?

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question.

Secretary McNAMARA. There is absolutely no connection whatsoever between the forced removal by the U.S. military pressure upon Cuba of the Soviet missiles introduced in Cuba on the one hand and not the removal but the modernization—of the missiles in Turkey and Italy.

Mr. GAVIN. Why are we getting out of Turkey?

The CHAIRMAN. We will take that up when we finish on Cuba.

Mr. GAVIN. Let him answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. We are interested in Cuba now.

He has answered the question. Let's get back to Cuba. Just as soon as we finish with Cuba we will go to that question.

I have written for the information on that—I don't know what it is—but confine yourself to Cuba. We will get to Turkey and Italy and other subjects a little later.

Mr. GAVIN. Then give us the reason why, if you had the island under surveillance [deleted] you recognized what was happening there, why we did not move in before we did with the quarantine?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Gavin, the offensive weapon systems which were the basis for the quarantine were not introduced, to the best of our knowledge, until shortly before the quarantine was established.

We believe, as was pointed out this morning, that the first ship bringing offensive weapons to Cuba arrived in early to mid-September, probably not before the 8th, possibly shortly after that.

Mr. GAVIN. Certainly they could not have completed this defense position, as exhibited to us here this morning, in so short a space of time. They must have been on the problem a great length of time to be able to develop the intensified defenses shown us here this morning.

We did not move in until October, did we, of 1962, with the quarantine?

Secretary McNAMARA. The offensive weapon systems we believe were first introduced early to mid-September and the entire development that you saw described here this morning occurred in the period of approximately 4 weeks.

The other systems that were discussed were moved in earlier during the period July 1 to mid-October.

That particularly applies to the surface-to-air missiles system. I think it is our present estimate that it probably came in around the first of August.

Is that right?

General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

In July there were 12 Soviet dry-cargo vessels that arrived in Cuba. There was an average of 14 each month prior to that back to last January.

So there wasn't any substantial volume buildup during the month of July of the movement of equipment into Cuba.

In the latter part of July certain vessels we feel did bring in equipment associated with the SA-2 sites.

But as is reflected in the fact that by October 14 they had not yet reached an operational capability, they had been in the process of being installed for the past 30 to 60 days.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gavin.

Mr. Hébert?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Secretary, I would like to know your estimate of the future of Cuba as related to our position.

It seems to me, from the information which we have from the intelligence community, and the estimates made here this morning, that we have to decide on a future position.

With this 17,000 personnel of the Russians in Cuba, Soviet, in Cuba, aren't they actually in a position of dominating the Government, and Castro, instead of being merely a puppet, is a prisoner?

We hear a lot of talk about the invasion or uprising must come from the island itself.

From a military viewpoint wouldn't that be absolutely impractical?

With the real control of the island in the hands of the Soviets now?

Isn't it another Hungary?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Hébert, of the 17,000 Soviet military personnel that we believe to be in the island today, we estimate approximately [deleted] are associated with the air defense system.

The remaining personnel include certain training personnel associated with training of Cuban units and Soviet combat personnel and combat units that might be used for the purpose that you have described are probably limited to something on the order of [deleted] persons.

Whether they are large enough in size to control the Cuban government, recognizing that the Cuban military force itself, both regular and militia, is large in number, if not in skill, I don't know.

Perhaps General Taylor would care to comment on that.

General TAYLOR. [Deleted.]

[Answer deleted.]

Mr. HÉBERT. As I understood the briefing this morning, there is a strong combat team in there, a very strong combat team, and while the Cubans themselves, the natives, may have numbers, they don't have the effectiveness of resistance.

I suggest that it is the same situation as Hungary.

What position are we in? Khrushchev certainly is not going to allow his base to escape from him there. He has a foothold. Some Cubans would rise, but we certainly would not have enough Cubans, as I envision it, to overthrow the Cuban government even if some of the present Cuban government and government people would go to our side and encourage invasion.

You have the same situation as you had prior to the entry of the Soviets into Hungary.

The position we would find ourselves in, and certainly have to make plans for, would be, suppose such a thing would occur, that the Soviets would immediately deploy more troops into Cuba. Where would you be?

Wouldn't that be really an invasion by a European power in this hemisphere?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would interpret it as an invasion; yes, sir, Mr. Hébert.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is important, I think. We have not written Cuba off, have we?

Secretary McNAMARA. We certainly have not.

Mr. HÉBERT. Thank you, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. Any other questions?

Mr. NORBLAD. Last fall there was talk about demanding on-the-ground inspection. I assume from what you said about our source of aerial reconnaissance, plus intelligence reports, you feel that is not necessary any longer?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would not say it is not necessary.

We have not been able to accomplish it. The sources of intelligence now open to us, particularly the aerial surveillance, in my personal view, are superior to the type of onsite inspection that we might expect under certain forms of international control.

Mr. NORBLAD. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Mr. Fisher?

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Secretary, two brief questions occurred to me.

No. 1: In view of the intensive antiaircraft buildup by the Soviets in Cuba, do you anticipate any increased difficulty in maintaining the aerial reconnaissance that seems to have been so effective in the past?

[Answer deleted.]

Mr. FISHER. One other question: A few months ago there was quite a stir in the press when the announcement was made that there was to be a Soviet naval installation in Cuba. What has happened to that?

Is there anything significant to it?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe the press reports were to the effect that the Soviets appeared to be establishing a submarine base in Cuba.

We have I believe discovered no evidence of such a base, either before or after October 14.

Perhaps General Carroll would care to comment further on that.

General CARROLL. That is correct; perhaps the press reports you are referring to were those which related to an agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba to construct a fish trawler base and it generated concern that that might be merely a disguise for a submarine facility.

All during the development of the Cuban situation and particularly with the almost uninhibited opportunity to scrutinize the island very closely, we have checked very, very thoroughly relative to any possibility of either submarine bases or refueling points being established.

We have from time to time received a number of reports to the effect that such an event was transpiring here or there about the island.

We have run all those down with completely negative results.

Mr. FISHER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

Any questions here?

Mr. Bray?

Mr. BRAY. Those pictures emphasized a problem that has been, I won't say worrying me, but which gives me some thought. That is, that there was apparently no attempt, at least in the early stage, to really camouflage those installations.

I am not an expert on camouflage, but I suppose I have had about the same experience as any officer of my years.

I know they did not do a very good job of camouflaging. In fact, the camouflaging impressed me that it looked like everything was done in emphasize these weapons coming in.

They could have moved them at night to get them off the docks. There is heavy timberland there that was not used for that purpose. I would not say they could have absolutely camouflaged them but they could have done a lot better job.

And perhaps this is not the place to introduce that. But there is always a possibility that a lot of that buildup was to get a trade for something else.

But they could have done a far better job of camouflaging than they did.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Doyle?

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the subversion.

Do you mean subversion from Cuba into some of the other South American nations?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. I would suggest that a clear attempt to assassinate a properly elected official of a Latin American Government directed by Cubans, for example, would be an act of subversion.

Mr. DOYLE. Would that be reason for us to invade Cuba?

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't wish to try to predict the policy of the Government under certain circumstances in the future, but I think that the President has made quite clear that we will not tolerate the use of Cuba as a base for subversion and aggression to be carried out throughout the hemisphere.

Mr. DOYLE. One more question.

Are we now flying low-altitude flights over Cuba three or four times a day?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, we are not.

Mr. DOYLE. Have we stopped them all?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have not stopped them all.

Mr. DOYLE. Isn't there a time numerically when a so-called defense force becomes an offense force without the presence of high-altitude or intercontinental missiles?

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't believe that the numerical increase in defense weapons, while it might under certain circumstances provide an offensive capability, will do so by itself in Cuba.

They obviously require an amphibious capability to allow this quantitative buildup in defensive weapons to take on an offensive character and that amphibious capability they do not now have.

Mr. DOYLE. And we are watching that also?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; we are.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson?

[Deleted.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Osmer?

Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Secretary, I have tried to approach the subject that we are discussing this morning from a little bit broader view than the days on which photographs we were looking at were taken.

We are confronted here, Mr. Chairman, with probably the greatest intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, we have a choice of three areas in which we can place the blame.

First, there was a criminal conspiracy of some kind on the part of the intelligence community because of its failure to report all of the facts as they knew them—which I doubt—or, second, we are witnessing a massive effort on the part of the Chief Executive and his Cabinet to mislead the Congress and the people because of the lack of timely action or, third, we have an intelligence community that is grossly incompetent or inadequate.

Do we realize what we have seen and heard here this morning. Cuba is a small place 90 miles from the United States. It is the size of New York State with a population the size of the State of New Jersey.

We have listened here this morning to the leading defense authorities of our Nation tell us that these huge vans, trucks, containers, missiles, bombers, boxes, can be moved across the island of Cuba but that we did not know one thing about it until a couple of days before they were ready to blow up half the country.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to question the Secretary as to whether it was some Tuesday afternoon when the first picture was taken, or whether it was some other afternoon.

All we do know is that when this matter was handed to the President of the United States he had hours to go.

Now, Mr. Chairman, what are we—this committee, as the representatives of the people in national defense, this is our responsibility—what are we going to do to prevent a recurrence of this intelligence calamity?

We are not here to rewrite history.

What are we, Mr. Chairman, as a committee, as representatives of the people, going to do to prevent a recurrence?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what suggestion have you got to offer?

Let's hear your suggestion.

Mr. OSMERS. Are you referring to me, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I am referring to you.

Mr. OSMERS. I think what we probably will have to do, Mr. Chairman—you asked me, didn't you?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. OSMERS. Let me answer—

The CHAIRMAN. When you present an indictment you must present a remedy.

Mr. OSMERS. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's hear your remedy.

Mr. OSMERS. If the gentleman will permit me to answer the question I will try to.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is completely inadequate for meeting the problems facing the country.

It is evident from everything that has been said here this morning.

Therefore, sir, I propose that we take the necessary steps to make it an adequate defense intelligence community. That is my recommendation.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted the record to show that you are a member of the committee that handles in the Armed Services Committee the subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. OSMERS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if you have any methods of strengthening it, then it is up to you to lay it before the committee.

Mr. OSMERS. We are here, Mr. Chairman, dealing with Cuba, a nation with thousands of friendly people. The words "human sources" are used here in a kind of a casual sense to describe them. It would seem to me that some of the "human sources" in Cuba must have told us what was happening last summer and fall.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

You have the responsibility—you and all of us have the responsibility—you are in a position where you can be heard with Director McCone on any criticism you have, we created the Central Intelligence, it is our responsibility, so let's do something, instead of just talking about it.

Mr. OSMERS. I am with you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. May I say, I was tremendously impressed with the presentation that you made here this morning.

I think it shows a remarkable intelligence, and I would like to commend you, as I have not had a chance to before, for your action in dealing with this crisis, and dealing with it effectively, and the fact that we can raise some of these questions here today is due to the fact that we acted effectively as we did in the Cuban crisis.

But there is an area here that disturbs me.

I have had some experience in intelligence work.

I remember when we got a briefing from General Carter, here in this room, toward the latter part of September—

Mr. WILSON. September 12.

Mr. STRATTON. We raised this question with General Carter, and I remember that he stressed not only the fact that the weapons that were in Cuba were defensive in nature, but he also went on to point out that there was no reason why the Soviets should put in any long-range offensive missiles in Cuba because they had the capacity to fire from the homeland and therefore did not need to go into Cuba.

Now, we also had some discussion of it in the press, and I know that the point has been made, and I think there is a feeling on the part of many of us that what General Carter said reflected a kind of an attitude on the part of either the intelligence community or the Defense Establishment, that the refugee reports not only were not subject to the kind of verification that you got when the U-2's flew, but that there was a kind of a mental predilection to even consider them seriously because of the deduction that the Soviets could not put long-range missiles into Cuba, since they did not need to.

Now, I would like you to comment on this, because we also have, if the things that I read in the paper are correct, Mr. Secretary, the information that one of the reasons for the apparent suddenness of this development was that for a period of a week or two you could not fly the U-2 flights because of the weather, and that therefore these objects which got into Cuba surreptitiously, apparently, were transported at night, so they were not subject to aerial surveillance, and then were deployed under cover of the weather. and did

break out apparently quite quickly, and the thing I am concerned about is whether there was in your judgment this kind of predilection that was, or was that something that could always creep into any intelligence effort, and secondly, whether the limitations of aerial photography, due to the weather, or due to the night movement, could present us with another one of these same situations, where we could wake up tomorrow and see the Soviets had brought these things all back.

Is that a feasible situation to be concerned about?

Secretary McNAMARA. As I suggested earlier, I don't believe we have a perfect system of intelligence collection with respect to ascertaining what is going on in any Communist bloc nation, and that would include Cuba.

On the other hand, I disagree with Mr. Osmer's position. I think it is an absolutely erroneous interpretation of the intelligence capabilities of this Nation as they relate to Cuba.

I don't believe it would be possible for the Soviet Union to introduce into Cuba substantial quantities of equipment which would endanger this Nation's security, without being detected by the intelligence resources we have at our disposal.

I think that the subject Mr. Osmer raised is so important, his charges so violent, that it would be appropriate for certain select members of the committee, who would be properly cleared, to discuss the matter at greater length.

I am limited in my ability to discuss with you this morning the steps that were taken, the reports that were received, because I think that to do so would destroy the security of some we have.

I do want to call your attention, however, to the point that Cuba is a closed society.

To damn the intelligence community as it has been damned here this morning, without knowing more about it and without being able to suggest a positive program that will improve the situation, I think is doing our Nation a disservice.

Now, as I say, I am limited in my ability to discuss this because to do so openly, even though I know all of you would respect the executive session, would, I think, run the risk of weakening our intelligence program, and I don't think you would wish me to do that.

I would be happy to have Mr. McCone and General Carroll discuss it with such of your representatives as you choose to investigate at any further length.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stratton.

Any further questions?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite through.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. STRATTON. Was there not a period between the middle of September when you saw that these missiles were introduced and the 14th of October, or the 17th of October, when you got the first photographic evidence, was there a period where we were aware that they were there?

I don't want to go into your highest information but can you answer that?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is an interesting period.

Perhaps General Carroll will comment further.

My recollection is, Joe, that you received three reports.

There were literally thousands of reports coming into CIA and DIA.
[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Let's not go into too much detail, General.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohelan.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Secretary, as you suggested that, on the U-2, one of our U-2's, on one of our overflights, was probably shot down?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COHELAN. My question is this: Why wasn't there further activity?

Can you comment on that? Why aren't they operating?

This is before the period when the Russians were there to man these things. It seems to me that they would have a very definite objective in trying to interfere.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think we failed to properly describe that earlier period.

Mr. COHELAN. But if they shot one down, why haven't they been successful in shooting more down?

Secretary McNAMARA. Because the loss of that aircraft occurred, I believe, on either the night of the 26th——

General CARROLL. October 27.

Secretary McNAMARA. Night of October 26 or morning of October 27 and it was just prior to the final capitulation on the 28th.

Mr. COHELAN. Of the 17,000 there, is there any Navy personnel there?

Secretary McNAMARA. We think there are something on the order of [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a meeting at 2 o'clock.

All members have the privilege of asking questions relating to Cuba.

Mr. GUBSER. It has been stated in the briefing this morning that large-hold ships carried these large missiles to Cuba and that the first time any evidence topside was [deleted].

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Secretary, that leads me to my second question, which involves a lot of speculation on my part.

Isn't it possible that we have suckered for a grand design on the part of the Russians where in phase I they send in strictly defensive weapons, phase II they make up their mind to a lack of camouflage, that they are going to ship in these offensive weapons, and that they are going to be discovered, obviously we are going to scream at that time, we will negotiate for removal of the offensive weapons, and in so doing, by us not asking for too much, in this negotiation, legitimize the extraordinary strength in defensive weapons that are already there, and in so legitimatizing these defensive weapons in extraordinary amounts and strength we are forever denying the Cuban people the opportunity of arising and overthrowing the Castro government, couldn't we have fallen sucker to a grand design like that, as I have described it?

Secretary McNAMARA. As you suggest, it involves substantial speculation to answer the question.

My own personal view is, no. I think that throughout the world today, both in the Communist bloc and in the non-Communist bloc, there is a clear recognition that Khrushchev capitulated.

This is the charge of the Communists—Chinese Communists. This is a question that is raised by many non-Communist Chinese.

It is generally accepted by the rulers in the Latin American governments and by their people and by the Western Europeans, that Khrushchev capitulated, and that it was a defeat for him.

Now, I don't wish to draw too much from this because it does involve speculation, and I don't feel certain to the point of saying that other views may not hold some water, but my own strong personal belief is that we did not sucker for a play by Khrushchev, that he has been defeated, and that our position in the world today is far stronger as a result of the action on the 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Just one question, Mr. Secretary.

There is one thing I wondered about. We had trouble in South America a year or two ago about going along with our recommendations and when they saw we meant business they joined us.

Do you have any difficulty with their attitude about leaving all their equipment in Russia?

What attitude is the South American countries going to take now?

Do they believe we mean business; are they weakening a little?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe the South American—Latin American nations do believe we mean business to support the aims.

The President has listed following October 28 that they are more united now in support of our policies than at any time in recent years.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price?

Mr. PRICE. Isn't it more than likely they knew we meant business when they found we had waited until we had conclusive evidence?

Secretary McNAMARA. It seems almost certain that neither the Latin American nations nor the Western European nations would have been as unified in support of our position had we not had that evidence and had we not displayed it.

Mr. PRICE. Had we acted on rumors, without verification, and without the evidence we finally got, we would not be in the good position we are in today?

Secretary McNAMARA. No question about that in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chamberlain?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Secretary, your presentation was very good, and I have just one question that I would like to ask, and this is: It was a tremendous operation as far as the Russians were concerned to supply these missiles to Cuba, to get the personnel there, to have the bottoms available, to have it all coordinated, and I am wondering if General Taylor, and you people that are experienced in this, could give me some estimate of when the decision might have been reached to go ahead and go forward with this operation, to have it all unfold as it did in September and October; when was that decision made?

Would it have to be made in February, or January, or September, or when?

Secretary McNAMARA. This, of course, also involves substantial amount of speculation—

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I understand that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNAMARA. I can't speak with any authority on it whatsoever.

I think, as was demonstrated this morning, as Mr. Hughes commented, the Russians moved with extraordinary speed and extraordinary efficiency after they landed on the shores of Cuba.

It is very probable they moved with similar speed and efficiency before they landed.

With that assumption, I think you could say that their decision was made sometime in the spring.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. One final question.

It is my understanding that we were prepared for a time to invade, if necessary, to go in full steam ahead with that ultimate alternative in mind.

Since we have lifted our quarantine and they have removed their missiles, am I correct in assuming that we have relaxed as far as our massing of an invasion force and such as that is concerned.

Secretary McNAMARA. We were prepared for whatever eventuality developed.

We had a portion of the Strategic Air Command on continuous alert.

They were in the air continuously. We were prepared for all eventualities, all that implies, down to a continuation of surveillance and quarantine, and we continue to be prepared.

I don't think it would be appropriate to discuss the details of our contingency plans, but they are complete and comprehensive.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. And on further provocative action, we are prepared?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pirnie?

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary.

Inasmuch as we were not aware of the introduction of missiles into Cuba until they were observed from the air, how could we be sure that they had all been removed?

Secretary McNAMARA. A number of bits of evidence tie together to assure that.

The aerial reconnaissance was so complete as to leave no doubt in our mind that we accounted for the removal of all offensive missiles from Cuba.

I therefore have no question in my mind but what all such missiles have been removed from Cuba.

Mr. PIRNIE. It depends upon our ability to observe, does it not?

Secretary McNAMARA. It does, but to observe a series of different movements. All of these pieces fit together to support what I believe to be the proper conclusion, that the IRBM and MRBM missiles have been removed from Cuba.

Mr. PIRNIE. I can see the logic of that, but it occurred to me that it might be possible to have missiles concealed and not on site, and also that mobile launching equipment might have been left there and concealed underground, some of this seemed to be quite obvious, as certain of the members have suggested, exposed for surveillance, and I just thought that if you originally were seeking on the site inspection in Cuba, you must have had a purpose in mind, and that was to cover this possible gap in information; is that true, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Mr. PIRNIE. How about the mobile launchers?

Am I correct that it is possible to move them into position and prepare for firing in a relatively short time?

Secretary McNAMARA. We would estimate a substantial period of time would be required to move them into position, particularly so when you consider the auxiliary equipment required.

As you say, the missile transporters are about 60 or 70 feet long, the so-called Cherry Pickers which are used in connection with it are sizable, the fuel trucks are large and sizable---this is a very substantial operation to conceal for any period of time, and it is also so substantial as to require a substantial period for plans and erection of facilities.

Mr. PIRNIE. One last question: Are we to understand that all the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba was accomplished without exacting any promise from us?

Secretary McNAMARA. Other than what was disclosed in the October 28 letter from the President to Khrushchev we stated if they would withdraw the missiles we would lift the quarantine.

Mr. PIRNIE. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. If they would allow onsite inspection we would do certain things.

Mr. PIRNIE. They did not allow the onsite inspection so it is our position that the consideration for that does not have to be given?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is quite correct.

There were no secret deals.

In other words, the quid pro quo was outlined in the October 28 letter.

Mr. PIRNIE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hall?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think most of my questions have been adequately exercised. I had one about the DIA and the CIA.

May I assume for the committee's information, Mr. Secretary, that they are in close coordination?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is quite correct.

Mr. McCone and General Carroll work very closely together.

General Taylor and I have very close relations with both of them.

Mr. HALL. And they did through this particular operation which DIA has presented here today?

Secretary McNAMARA. They did.

Mr. HALL. No. 2 was about the allegation of Mr. Hughes that this was a beautiful clandestine effort.

I know it was clandestine, from the point of view that they did it in secret in violation of their word. But Mr. Bray and Mr. Gubser pointed out, and as you confirmed it is in the realm of speculation, but it occurred to many of us, and many of the people are asking, why did they do it so overtly, rather than clandestinely, as though they expected to be discovered.

Can we assume that has been thoroughly exercised in our plans and retaliatory reaction?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. I think though it is our own conclusion, certainly it is mine, that they have exercised considerable care to keep it covert.

They have very certain deficiencies but there was considerable evidence they were using all the skill they were capable of to maintain it covertly.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Secretary, it is obvious from the way the committee had exercised this problem this morning and the presentation which has been given that the point of Cuba is vital to the people of America.

I am not the least bit interested in water that has run under the bridge, but how does it happen that in this document no reference was made to Cuba---that is, roughly, no reference---whereas we have exercised southeast Asia and so forth.

Is it not considered important in the continuing plans as far as policy and as far as the Armed Services Committee is concerned?

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, yes; it is an extremely important subject. It is not mentioned in this particular document because the chairman, recognizing its importance to all of you, had specifically asked me to comment on it separately and in order to do it extensively I did not wish to extend that document.

Mr. HALL. You received a letter from the chairman long before you prepared this?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. Weeks ago I received that request.

Mr. HALL. One final question. I am very thankful that this situation developed in Cuba rather than in Iran, knowing something about logistics, or even some other place, where Khrushchev would not have been off balance or overextended with his lines of supply, if indeed he was.

It has been brought out here that we have for the first time unanimity of the Organization of American States behind us and worldwide opinion.

Can you tell the committee why we did not finish the job when we had everything going for us?

Secretary McNAMARA. We did finish the job of removing the offensive weapons systems.

Mr. HALL. We still have quite a cancer beneath our skin there, just 70 miles or so.

Secretary McNAMARA. This raises the question of the Communist bloc as a whole, the Eastern European states, the rest of the world.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Secretary, what I want to know is, Did we not do it because of fear of a general nuclear war, did we not do it because of those 21,000 Russians there, that we were afraid to confront, did we not do it for some reason not known to the committee?

I don't want you to give me your "op" plan, but can that be answered in a brief sentence along one of those three lines?

Secretary McNAMARA. No; we confronted the Soviet Union with nuclear war over the issue of the offensive weapons and forced them to remove the offensive weapons rather than engaging in nuclear war.

This was our purpose; it was our objective; we accomplished it.

Mr. HALL. But will there ever be a more ideal time, and be less costly in lives, and everything else, to completely eliminate this "thorn in our flesh"?

Secretary McNAMARA. The question is, How costly would it have been in lives to eliminate the thorn?

Mr. OSMERS. Could I make an observation, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. OSMERS. I am somewhat fearful that the committee might gather from what I said before, that I am making a broadside attack on the entire intelligence community, much of which may be blameless.

I want the committee to know that I am referring to intelligence evaluation as well as the gathering of information by intelligence agencies.

Mr. HALL. I want to follow that one point further—that last question.

Can you tell the committee, in view of the 17,000 technicians, Russian soldiers, and so forth, that you have so beautifully laid out

for us here this morning, what type of force as of now would be required by us to solve this situation, finally solve it, resolve it?

Secretary McNAMARA. Could I tell the committee, Mr. Chairman, this might get into contingency war plans, but they have them, they are in existence, the Chiefs continually review them, particularly those associated with the subjects we are talking about.

I think it would be quite unwise to even discuss them in detail. I am not withholding information. I really throw myself on your discretion. I think it would be unwise to pursue it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will cross that bridge when we come to it.

Secretary McNAMARA. As General Taylor just pointed out to me, I guess the best answer is, we have what it takes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have what it takes?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. HALL. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Foreman, any questions?

Mr. FOREMAN. [Deleted.]

Mr. HALL. My question is, [deleted] it appears to me it would be possible they could get back on the offensive, get some offensive weapons, but regardless of that, let me put a simple question.

Why don't we confront them with what we did, why don't we say, "We want all your defensive weapons removed right now," like we did, "We want all of your offensive weapons removed," why don't we do that?

Secretary McNAMARA. A series of other actions, of course, follow that, and the net result would almost certainly be extensive armed conflict.

The question is: Is this in our national interest?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Now, members of the committee, we will take a recess until 2 o'clock.

Mr. Secretary, I want you then to discuss the Turkish situation before you start on your prepared text.

Secretary McNAMARA. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And let those books stay here.

We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. SMART. You have a quorum, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. A quorum is present.

Let the committee come to order.

Now, members of the committee, I requested that the Secretary be prepared to give you some information in reference to the removal of the JUPITER missiles out of Turkey and out of Italy.

We have seen something in the paper about it. But I think it is highly important to get the statement from the Secretary in regard to the matter.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I have a few paragraphs written down.

Perhaps I can read it very quickly and then I will be very pleased to answer questions with respect to this subject.

As the President stated in his press conference last Thursday, we are planning to replace the JUPITER missiles in both Italy and Turkey, replace them with POLARIS missile submarines.

In 1957 when the decision was made to install the JUPITERS, they, along with the THOR's, were the only strategic missiles NATO had ready for deployment.

These missiles helped greatly to build up our early ballistic missile strength.

But with the rapid advances in technology and with the accelerating growth of our missile forces, they no longer form a major part of NATO's missile strength.

And this year alone, for example, the number of operational strategic ballistic missiles in the Alliance will increase from approximately 450 to over 800.

And more importantly, as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy noted in their report in February 1961, when they recommended the replacement of the JUPITER missiles with a mobile solid-fueled missile system, the JUPITER missiles are liquid fueled, easily located by the enemy, and vulnerable not only to conventional and nuclear attack but also to sabotage.

It seems to us desirable, therefore, for these reasons to replace the weapons, the JUPITERS with the more modern weapon system.

The best available alternative is the POLARIS system.

These submarine-borne POLARIS missiles would have a very much higher probability of survival in the face of a sudden nuclear attack.

Aside from the present advantages of the POLARIS system, it, unlike the JUPITER, has a growth potential extending for a period of years into the future.

And we therefore propose that the POLARIS submarines begin operation in the Mediterranean the first half of this year.

This POLARIS force would be assigned to SACEUR, and it would be targeted by him.

As early as April 1961, we began the discussions with the Turkish Government in particular of the approaching obsolescence of the JUPITER missiles and the need for replacing them.

During the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris last December, I discussed the replacement of the JUPITERS with the Ministers of Defense of both Turkey and Italy.

And subsequently the U.S. Government initiated the formal discussions, and the Italian and Turkish Governments have indicated acceptance in principle, although the details have not yet been fully worked out.

It has been our policy and will continue to be our policy to assist our allies in the provision of increasingly effective military defenses through a measured and a continued phaseout of old and obsolete weapons systems and replacement of those systems with new and modern systems.

This JUPITER replacement by POLARIS is in accordance with that policy.

Mr. Chairman, I will be very happy to endeavor to answer the committee's questions as to any particular aspect of this that they are interested in.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arends, have you any questions on this?

Mr. ARENDS. The only question I had, Mr. Secretary: Did you find any opposition from either one of the nations as to your proposal, either Turkey or Italy? Did they offer opposition?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I wouldn't say there was opposition. I think there was a question as to whether modern systems would be made available to replace the JUPITER's.

I should explain to you that while the discussion in the press had related solely to the JUPITER's, in each instance the program is quite a bit broader than the JUPITER's.

In the case of Italy, for example, there are presently CORPORAL missile systems located in Italy manned by U.S. personnel, but fulfilling an Italian-NATO commitment.

It is our intention to replace those obsolete CORPORAL missile systems with SERGEANT missiles, a new and modern system.

And in the case of Italy, therefore, we have been talking about modernizing both the JUPITER and the CORPORAL.

Mr. ARENDS. What range do those missiles have?

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, these are tactical systems.

The CORPORAL is on the order of 25 to 50 miles, maximum——

General TAYLOR. Seventy-five.

Secretary McNAMARA. Seventy-five. And the SERGEANT, roughly the same.

But the CORPORAL is an old, obsolete, unwieldy system, with a very slow reaction time.

The SERGEANT is our latest system of that range.

Mr. ARENDS. Well, while we recognize, Mr. Secretary, they know where these installations are, our potential enemies know where they are.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. ARENDS. The only thought that would flash through my mind would be that they cause them to waste some ammunition, shall we say, or some missiles attacking these particular spots.

Even so, at least we would make a gain.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I think that is a possibility.

But I believe the committee, Mr. Chairman, would be interested in the views of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the members of which inspected these particular sites and wrote a very extensive report on the subject, dated February 11, 1961.

I would like to read two paragraphs from that, from page 30.

This report was discussed personally by the chairman of that committee with me and with the President, and we had quite an extended discussion on it at the time and it has been a major element affecting our decision.

The report states:

The JUPITER missiles observed in Italy by members of the committee are particularly vulnerable to sabotage. A public highway is located in one instance directly adjacent to the perimeter fence enclosing the launching site. As also observed and noted, private residences are also nearby and the surrounding countryside is flat with a great deal of scrub brush.

Liquid fueled missiles such as the JUPITER are particularly vulnerable to rifle fire, in that the skin of the missile is extremely thin and easily punctured.

Any rifle shot would immediately result in the missile becoming inoperative through loss of fuel and reduction of pressure. This particular area of Italy is known to have a substantially higher proportion of Communists than the average indicated by the 22.8 percent of the popular vote achieved by the Communist Party in 1958 national elections.

In periods of tension and incipient hostilities, the vulnerability of these missiles to such sabotage would appear especially acute.

And a second paragraph relating in this instance to Turkey.

Compared with the solid-fueled mobile POLARIS missile or second generation medium range ballistic missiles offered by former Secretary Herter in his speech before the NATO Council in December of 1960, the liquid fueled fixed JUPITERS are obsolete weapons. Since they will not be placed in hardened bases and will not be mobile, their retaliatory value is highly questionable. In the event of hostilities, assuming NATO will not strike the first blow, the U.S.S.R. with its ballistic missile capability logically could be expected to take out these bases on the first attack, which undoubtedly would be a surprise attack.

And they go on to say:

Construction therefore should not be permitted to begin on the five JUPITER sites in Turkey. Instead of placing 15 obsolete liquid-fueled JUPITERS in Turkey, an alternative system such as a POLARIS submarine with 16 IRBM's operated and controlled by U.S. personnel could be assigned to NATO in lieu of the 15 JUPITERS. Such an assignment could be made before 1962 when the JUPITER system would be coming into operation. The POLARIS submarine system would be mobile and thus a much better retaliatory force.

Now it goes on and on in this vein.

Mr. ARENDS. That is a public document.

Mr. PRICE. It is a classified document.

Secretary McNAMARA. Portions of it are classified, but this particular part that I read from I believe is unclassified.

Mr. ARENDS. Unclassified.

What is the date of that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is dated February 11, 1961, and I was reading from page 30, paragraphs subsection (a) and a portion of subsection (b).

Mr. ARENDS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you practically followed the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission [sic].

Secretary McNAMARA. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; yes, sir.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait 1 minute.

Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. You said that the Alliance would have 800 as against 400 missiles now.

Well, the Alliance means the United States. Nobody else has missiles, do they, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, there is a loss of missiles during this year by other than the United States, because the British are removing the THOR and we have taken account of those figures.

But at the end of the year the missiles in the Alliance are possessed by the United States.

Mr. RIVERS. And the modernization that you speak of in Italy for the U.S. troops are the missiles located in Verona complex? Is that the ones you are talking about?

Secretary McNAMARA. You are speaking now of the CORPORAL?

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. That is the area you are talking about?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. I see. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that that is more than just a perfunctory report.

The committee put over a year of study into this proposition. And that resulted from an on-site inspection by the committee in the fall of 1960.

And it was an unanimous report from the committee, particularly of the members who visited these sites, including both sides—Craig Hosmer signed it and Jack Westland signed it.

So it was an unanimous opinion of the committee that something should be done about the JUPITER situation.

I think the Joint Committee at least is very happy that action has been taken, or that is being taken at least on this matter. What the report said, in unclassified language, was that during the period November 26–December 15, 1960, the following members and staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy visited military installations in seven NATO countries and in Spain: Representative Chet Holifield, chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation; Representative Wayne N. Aspinall; Senator Wallace F. Bennett; Representative Craig Hosmer; Representative Jack Westland; James T. Ramey, Executive Director; John T. Conway, Assistant Director; Lt. Col. Richard C. Lunger, staff consultant.

On the basis of the visit a report was prepared, the final draft of which was approved February 11, 1961, and a copy furnished to the President under date of February 15, 1961. Copies were also made available to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others in the Government who had responsibilities within the purview of the report.

The JUPITER missiles in Italy and planned for Turkey were subject to comment in the report. Included in the recommendations of the report was the following:

Construction should not be permitted to begin on the five JUPITER sites in Turkey. Instead of placing 15 obsolete liquid fuel IRBM's in Turkey, an alternative system such as a POLARIS submarine with 16 IRBM's, operated and controlled by U.S. personnel, could be assigned to NATO in lieu of the 15 JUPITERS. Such an assignment could be made before 1962 when the JUPITER system would be coming into operation. The POLARIS submarine system would be mobile and thus a much better retaliatory force.

Criticism of the existing JUPITER system in Italy also was contained in the report, particularly as to its vulnerability. The full committee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy subsequently held hearings during the next 2 years in executive session in which the ad hoc report was the subject of the hearing. During these followup hearings the committee repeatedly was critical of JUPITER systems in Italy and Turkey.

Following are some of the dates in which the Joint Committee discussed with representatives of the Department of State, Defense Department, and AEC, the NATO ad hoc report: February 7, 1961, February 20, 1961, April 26, 1961, August 23, 1961, March 1, 2, 1962, September 18, 1962.

Was that decision reached along in February of 1961?

Mr. PRICE. Well, this report was issued. The decision is just now coming into being; is that right?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Price is quite correct in emphasizing the strong views of the committee.

Because when they came back, although the administration had just come into office a few days prior to the date of the report, the committee members felt so strongly on this that they had a series of personal meetings with me, for example, and with the President. We discussed it at great length.

We began in April of that year, just 40 or 50 days after the date of the report, to begin to try to act on the recommendations of the committee.

Secretary Rusk at that time began a series of conversations with members of the Government; that is Turkey and Italy. But it has taken from then until now to work this out.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions from any members of the committee about removal of the JUPITER.

(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Norblad.

Mr. NORBLAD. Just one question.

You spoke about the growth potential of the POLARIS.

Did you mean by "growth potential" the distance of the firing or the warhead?

Secretary McNAMARA. No. Accuracy, range, and warhead carrying capability, both in terms of yield and weight.

Mr. NORBLAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. I am interested not from the point of view of the JUPITER, Mr. Secretary, but from the point of view of the replacement by the POLARIS.

Secretary McNAMARA. In—

Mr. HALL. Does that mean we will still keep complete control in our own U.S. Navy of the POLARIS and the fleet ballistic missile atomic nuclear powered submarines?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. The POLARIS will be manned 100 percent by U.S. crews.

The CHAIRMAN. And later on, Mr. Secretary, when we get to that point in your statement where you point out that POLARIS will be given to NATO, probably we will develop some questions along that line.

Secretary McNAMARA. Perhaps in relation to the Nassau Pact and some implications.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will be very happy to discuss that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. PRICE. On that point, Mr. Chairman, it won't be given to NATO, but it will be made available and assigned to NATO.

Secretary McNAMARA. It would be assigned to NATO, exactly, Mr. Price.

The CHAIRMAN. Assigned.

Mr. PRICE. For support.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to know who pays for the upkeep and all those kinds of things.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Huddleston.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of THOR in Britain?

Secretary McNAMARA. There are about 60 THOR missiles in the United Kingdom, and those are being phased out gradually between roughly the 1st of April of this year and the 1st of October.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. What will they be replaced with?

Secretary McNAMARA. To the best of my knowledge, the British—these are British missiles—are not planning to replace them immediately with any other system.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I thought the THOR would be involved in the replacement of the British NATO obligation by POLARIS submarines.

Secretary McNAMARA. No.

This is a British system. A decision to replace them was not our decision. It was a British decision.

I am not entirely familiar with the way in which the British look upon it.

But I am certain that they don't have any other missile system available to replace them during 1963.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions on this—
(Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.")

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohelan.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Secretary, I am wondering—and I have had occasion to discuss this matter recently—does this in any way weaken our military posture, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I think not.

Because these JUPITER missiles are so highly vulnerable that basically they have a first strike capability, but very little if any secondary strike capability.

Mr. COHELAN. Isn't there any psychological loss?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think there is a psychological loss if they are not to be replaced.

Even though they are obsolete and at least as obsolete as the British THOR's that are not being replaced, nonetheless were they not to be replaced in Italy and Turkey, I personally believe there would be a psychological loss.

They are, however, being replaced by the POLARIS, which will be assigned to duty in the Mediterranean and pick up their targets. And also other systems—in the case of Turkey, aircraft are being modernized, and in the case of Italy the CORPORAL system is being modernized.

Mr. COHELAN. The question of the withdrawal of the JUPITER, what was the position of the Joint Chiefs?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that the Chiefs would have been very much opposed—General Taylor can speak to this, but I think the Chiefs would have been very much opposed to this had they not been subject to replacement with POLARIS submarines and had not our total Western World missile strength been increasing so rapidly as it is during this year.

Between the 1st of July of this year and the 31st of August, about 248 ballistic missiles will be added to the U.S. force.

Mr. COHELAN. I wonder if the general would be good enough to comment on that?

General TAYLOR. [Deleted.]

Mr. COHELAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You strengthen your global defense by substituting the POLARIS for this type of weapons?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; and inevitably the modernization program should have been carried forward. Perhaps we should have started earlier as a matter of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I just want to inquire when our JUPITER missiles become operational?

Secretary McNAMARA. In 1962. I can't give you the exact date. Maybe we have it here. They become operational over a period of time, but I would think that it was around July.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. So, really, not even a year?

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, it is a very short time.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. A matter of months. And we are phasing them out?

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. When did we reach agreement with the Turkish Government for placing them in their country?

Secretary McNAMARA. In, I believe it was 1960, this happened before this administration came into office. And I can't therefore give you the exact date, although I will search the record for it.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. It is not necessary.

Secretary McNAMARA. But it was in 1960, I think.

The interesting point to me and the point that the joint committee emphasized in its conversations with us in February and March of 1961 was the conclusion of the joint committee members who had visited the site. As Mr. Price said, the Turkish JUPITERS should never have been placed in position.

And therefore our first objective in talking to the Turkish Government in the initial conversations between Secretary Rusk and the Turkish Government was to try to achieve that objective. But at that point we did not have POLARIS available to replace them.

And as Mr. Cohelan or one of the others pointed out, there would have been a psychological loss to the West of simply canceling the program and failing to replace them—the missiles—simultaneously with some other more modern system.

At least this was the way the Turks looked at it. And they therefore refused to modify the agreement at that time. And we had to go ahead and finish the construction and place them in operation.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Thank you.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett?

Mr. BENNETT. Could I make just a suggestion?

Judging from my correspondence, a good portion of the American people still feel, or do feel, that Turkey withdraw all of these weapons, I mean the weapons that are being withdrawn from Turkey, has something to do with Cuba and that there is a possibility of agreement by the President with Khrushchev that this was to be considered in the withdrawal of these weapons from Cuba.

(Secretary McNamara nods.)

Mr. BENNETT. Now you made a very clear-cut picture to the contrary here.

It is just a suggestion I am trying to make to you, that perhaps it might be, to strengthen the confidence of the American people and